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Evolution of Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAV), as an important class of Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS), plays a crucial role in providing innovative services in transport
and traffic management. Vehicle platoons, as a set of CAV, forming a string of connected
vehicles, have offered significant enhancements in traffic management, energy consumption,
and safety in intelligent transportation systems. However, due to the existence of the cyber
layer in these systems, subtle security related issues have been underlined and need to be
taken into account with sufficient attention. In fact, despite the benefits brought by the
platoons, they potentially suffer from insecure networks which provide the connectivity
among the vehicles participating in the platoon which makes these systems prone to be
under the risk of cyber attacks. One (or more) external intelligent intruder(s) might attack
one (or more) of the vehicles participating in a platoon. In this respect, the need for a safe
and secure driving experience is highly sensible and crucial. Hence, we will concentrate on
improving the safety and security of CAVs in different scenarios by taking advantage of
security related approaches and CAV control systems.
In this thesis, we are going to focus on two main levels of platoon control, namely I) High
level secure platoon control, and II) Low level secure platoon control. In particular, in the
high level part, we consider platoons with arbitrary inter-vehicular communication topoloy
whereby the vehicles are able to exchange their driving data with each other through
DSRC-based environment. The whole platoon is modeled using graph-theoretic notions by
denoting the vehicles as the nodes and the inter-vehicular communication quality as the
edge weights. We study the security of the vehicle platoon exposed to cyber attacks using
a novel game-theoretic approach. The platoon topologies under investigation are directed
(called predecessor following) or undirected (bidirectional) weighted graphs. The attacker-
detector game is defined as follows. The attacker targets some vehicles in the platoon to
attack and the detector deploys monitoring sensors on the vehicles. The attacker’s objective
is to be as stealthy to the sensors as possible while the detector tries to place the monitoring
sensors to detect the attack impact as much as he can. The existence of equilibrium
strategies for this game is investigated based on which the detector can choose specific
vehicles to put his sensors on and increase the security level of the system. Moreover,
we study the effect of adding (or removing) communication links between vehicles on the
game value. We then address the same problem while investigating the optimal actuator
placement strategy needed by the defender to mitigate the effects of the attack. In this
respect, the energy needed by the attacker to steer the consensus follower-leader dynamics
of the system towards his desired direction is used as the game payoff. Simulation and
experimental results conducted on a vehicle platoon setup using Robotic Operating System
(ROS) demonstrate the effectiveness of our analyses.
v
In the low level platoon control, we exploit novel secure model predictive controller
algorithms to provide suitable countermeasure against a prevalent data availability at-
tack, namely Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. A DoS intruder can endanger the security
of platoon by jamming the communication network among the vehicles which is respon-
sible to transmit inter-vehicular data throughout the platoon. In other words, he may
cause a failure in the network by jamming it or injecting a huge amount of delay, which in
essence makes the outdated transferred data useless. This can potentially result in huge
performance degradation or even hazardous collisions. We propose novel secure distributed
nonlinear model predictive control algorithms for both static and dynamic nonlinear het-
erogeneous platoons which are capable of handling DoS attack performed on a platoon
equipped by different communication topologies and at the same time they guarantee
the desired formation control performance. Notably, in the dynamic case, our proposed
method is capable of providing safe and secure control of the platoon in which arbitrary
vehicles might perform cut-in and/or cut-out maneuvers. Convergence time analysis of
the system are also investigated. Simulation results on a sample heterogeneous attacked
platoon exploiting two-predecessor follower communication environment demonstrates the
fruitfulness of the method.
vi
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Over recent years, the need to establish distributed control systems has been one of the
significant motivations for emergence of large scale systems. This becomes feasible through
newly developed systems, namely Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), which provides the op-
portunity not only to have large scale wide spread control systems but also to take ad-
vantage of wireless data communication approaches. In other words, CPS are among the
fast emerging profound infrastructures enabling traditional physical plants to operate in
a wide area and a distributed fashion. Networking, computation, communication, and
control are tightly interwoven to foster a CPS [1]. These components are categorized in
cyber and physical layers, each of which interacts with the other parts to receive external
data, process them, and generate appropriate output signals. Never may a CPS perform
correctly without properly and timely functioning of its constituents. Instances of CPS in-
clude, but not limited to, Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAV), medical monitoring,
robotic systems, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and smart grid [2]. In this thesis, we
will focus on CAV in platooning as our primary application. Although, benefiting from
communication channels has enhanced the solicitation for CPS, the vulnerability of such
systems to malicious external attackers has attracted a great amount of attention [3]. No-
tably, apart from the physical layer, the cyber one has been broadly shown to be prone
to external intelligent cyber attacks. Data integrity, confidentiality, and availability are
the major crucial concerns of cyber-security that an intelligent intruder might target [4,5].
Various attacks have been introduced to destruct one or more of the aforementioned secu-
rity aspects of a CPS. False data injection, GPS spoofing, eavesdropping, Denial-of-Service
1
Figure 1.1: A general scheme of vehicular cyber-physical system [15]
(DoS), and replay attack are some of the paradigms [6–10]. Several well-known attacks
on CPS include Stuxnet on a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tem [11, 12], attacks on the wireless network channels in smart power grid systems [13],
and compromising Anti-lock Braking System (ABS) sensors of a vehicle [14]. Hence, the
security related issues, such as attack detection and secure state estimation, and control
of CPS have been converted to attracting challenges in the control community.
CAVs are a class of CPS as they utilize communication, computation, sensing and ac-
tuation (see Fig. 1.1). CAVs can communicate with each other and exchange their date
through Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and/or Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) wireless commu-
nications. We need to notice that this structure can be exposed to malicious adversarial
attacks as well. Either the communication links can be in the risk of delays and/or other
false data injection attacks or there might be a malicious agent among the autonomous
cars. The latter case can happen in a setting in which the connected cars include several
agents driving based on their own learned policies. Since we intend to focus on CAV pla-
tooning as our main application, we provide a comprehensive introductory material and
some backgrounds on this application in the following.
Due to the huge growth in the number of vehicles driving in the world, traffic congestion
2
threaten the driving safety. This will potentially result in increasing the risk of accidents.
Autonomous vehicles and autonomous driving is another aspect which has got a great
deal of attention. Through this technological development, driving safety can be highly
enhanced as most of the car accidents are caused by human errors and distractions while
driving. Over 90% of all car accidents are caused by human errors [16]. From this point of
view, self driving cars can remove a considerable amount of human errors resulting in safer
transportation. In Canada alone there were close to 111,000 road related injuries, and over
1,800 fatalities reported in 2014 [17]. Autonomous cars have many other advantages such
as getting faster to the destination, reducing governmental costs and car ownership [18,19].
The degree of autonomy incorporated in autonomous driving is categorized in 6 differ-
ent levels (levels 0-5). Level 0 (no automation) is the most basic one in which no autonomy
is incorporated. The vehicle is fully controlled by a human driver. In level 1 (driver assis-
tance), the vehicle can assist the driver with some functions, such as steering, acceleration,
or braking. In level 2 (partial automation) the vehicle lets the driver disinvolve with some
of these tasks. The driver has still the main role to monitor the environment and to take
care of most safety-critical functions. The driver is responsible to take the full control of
the vehicle when needed. In level 3 (conditional automation), the vehicle performs all the
environment monitoring tasks. In safe conditions, the driver can leave the safety-critical
functions like braking to the vehicle; however, his attention is still required. Level 4 (high
automation) of autonomy is able to take care of monitoring the environment, steering, ac-
celeration, and braking. In addition, the vehicle is capable of changing lanes, turning and
using signals. However, the vehicle can not perform decisions in more complex scenarios,
such as traffic jams or merging onto the highway. Level 5 (complete automation) exploits
a full autonomy which requires no human intervention, pedals, brakes, or a steering wheel.
As was mentioned before, autonomous cars can be equipped with wireless data com-
munication devices such that they can transfer data such as inter-vehicular distance and
speed. In this respect, CAVs typically take advantage of V2V and/or V2I communication
environments. V2V communications can provide direct data transfer with a much lower
delay compared to radars [21]. The V2V communications enable vehicles to drive closely
with short inter-vehicular distances. This will increase the amount of road throughput and
reduce the need for developing more road network. The vehicles can exchange data, such
as inter-vehicular distance, speed and acceleration. In this context, Cooperative Adap-
tive Cruise Control (CACC) system has been widely developed featuring the possibility
of coordination between connected vehicles aiming at enhancing the fuel efficiency, safety,
driving comfort, and road throughput. This system, that is the advanced version of Adap-
tive Cruise Control (ACC), lets neighboring vehicles form a platoon which is a string of
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Figure 1.2: Scania truck platooning [20]
vehicles following a common speed profile (see Fig. 1.2 for instance).
Vehicle platooning can exhibit various scenarios, such as single-lane platooning or multi-
lane platooning. Many research works have tackled both of these problems. For instance,
the works [22–24] have focused on the single-lane platooning and authors of [25–27] studied
the multi-lane platooning problem. In a multi-lane platooning scenario, which is a gen-
eralization of single-lane platooning, there are at least two strings of CAVs driving with
possible different speeds in adjacent lanes. In this situation some vehicles might decide to
perform a cut-in or cut-out action to exit their own platoon and merge with the neighboring
one safely. It is also notable that simpler cases of this problem, such as general lane change
or on-ramp merging have already been studied [28, 29]. For instance, in on-ramp merging
scenario a vehicle tries to safely merge into a platoon from a ramp (see Fig. 1.3) [29].
Some research works have also focused on studying interaction protocols for cooperative
and highway platoon merging [30–32].
At the heart of developing AV and CAV, control design is one of the most prominent
tasks which needs to be taken into account with significant care. Design of the intended
controller tackles numerous challenges. One of the most significant classes of these chal-
lenges is the presence of unknown uncertainties which can unpredictably affect the resulting
system. We will focus on these uncertainties in the current research. These uncertainties
include a vast range of unknown situations, such as driving behavior, road friction varia-
tions, and so on [33, 34]; however, the ones that we are going to take into account include
acceleration attacks and V2V/V2I communication attacks such as communication delays
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Figure 1.3: Single-lane platooning with an on-ramp merging formation [29]
(see Fig. 1.4).
1.2 Motivation
Existence of adversarial attackers makes the problem of controlling a vehicle platoon chal-
lenging. Due to the presence of such attackers, the normal operation of a platoon is surely
endangered. This highlights the need for secure control methodologies for a safe platooning
experience. As was explained before, CAVs forming platoons have significant environmen-
tal and transportational benefits. The simple case is the single-lane platoon in which a
string of connected vehicles coordinate with each other to safely follow a common speed
profile generated by the leader vehicle. The platoon is required to keep the minimum safe
distance between the sequence of vehicles. In practice, it is most often the case where sev-
eral platoons with possible different speeds trip along a multi-lane highway. In this case,
the vehicles need to be ensured that they can safely and securely perform cut-in/cut-out
maneuvers to travel between different adjacent platoons. Homogeneous platoons consist of
identical vehicles with same model dynamics. However, existing of different vehicles with
different model dynamics results in even a more challenging scenario called a heterogeneous
platoon. In this scenario, it is important that regardless of variety in the model of the ve-
hicles the control system can still ensure the safety of the platoon in addition to providing
a safe environment for cut-in/cut-out actions. Besides, exposure of the communication
among the vehicles to attacks may make the situation even worse.
Various control methods such as adaptive control, robust control, optimal control,
Model Predictive Control (MPC), Stochastic-MPC (SMPC), have been largely utilized to
tackle autonomous driving challenges in different scenarios like unsignalized intersection,
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Figure 1.4: Possible existing uncertainties in an autonomous driving context
roundabouts, uncertain environments, and multi-lane traffic situation [35–40]. Although
these methods have shown promising accomplishments in single autonomous driving con-
text, when the connectivity notion arises in a set of connected vehicles, the aforementioned
methods have significant limitations confining their applicability in these scenarios where
connectivity issues such as cyber attacks and communication delays might occur.
With the above mentioned explanations in mind, it is highly significant to address
the vehicle platooning problem along with its security related issues (in the presence of
cyber attacks). This motivates us to develop control methods which then can be utilized
in the context of CAVs in order to have a safe and secure connected autonomous driving
experience.
1.3 Objectives
This thesis is structured into two main parts: I) High level secure platoon control, and
II) Low level secure platoon control
High level secure platoon control: In this part, we consider platoons with arbitrary
inter-vehicular communication topology whereby the vehicles are able to exchange
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their driving data with each other through DSRC-based environment. The whole
platoon is modeled using graph-theoretic notions by denoting the vehicles as the
nodes and the inter-vehicular communication quality as the edge weights. Although
we consider linear second/third-order models for vehicle dynamics, this is to define
and fulfill the platoon control objectives while not bothering ourselves with control
input signal such as the amount of torque sent to the wheels.
Low level secure platoon control: In this part, the platoon can still encompass arbi-
trary wireless connectivity among the cars; however, we pay more attention to the
nonlinear dynamics of the participating vehicles in the platoon and will not linearize
the model based on which new nonlinear control algorithms are introduced accord-
ingly. In addition, we let the vehicles bear different dynamics to form nonlinear het-
erogeneous platoons. The required amount of control signals (such as torque) sent
to the wheels to meet the control objectives and also the resulting absolute/relative
position, speed, and acceleration of each of the vehicles are given.
The main objectives of this thesis are as follows:
• High level secure platoon control:
1. The first objective is to study the security of a vehicle platoon equipped by
unidirectional or bidirectional communication links among the vehicles using a
game-theoretic approach. We aim at defining a game wherein the attacker and
the detector are its players. The attacker targets some vehicles in the platoon
to attack and the detector deploys monitoring sensors on the vehicles. The
attacker’s objective is to be as stealthy to the sensors as possible while the
detector tries to place the monitoring sensors to detect the attack impact as
much as it can (Chapter 3).
2. The second objective is to find a novel optimal actuator placement strategy
according to a defined Stackelberg game between the attacker and the defender.
Based on the defined game and its optimal equilibrium point, the defender(s)
selects optimal actuator placement action to face the attacker(s) (Chapter 4).
• Low level secure platoon control:
3. The third objective is to tackle a common cyber attack, namely the Denial-of-
Service (DoS) occurred in the communication links of a static vehicle platoon via
a new secure model predictive control approach. The controller has to be able to
fulfill the platoon speed tracking and minimum safe desired space requirements
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along with facing the DoS attack. The vehicles participating in the platoon
are to modeled by nonlinear dynamics and could be different resulting in a
heterogeneous platoon (Chapter 5).
4. The fourth objective is to extend the results to the dynamic platooning case
wherein cut-in/cut-out maneuvers can also be performed by the vehicles partic-
ipating in the platoon. This requires the controller to handle a DoS attacked
dynamic nonlinear heterogeneous vehicle platoon (Chapter 6).
1.4 Thesis Layout
Chapter 3 proposes a game-theoretic approach to investigate the security level of a pla-
toon exposed to cyber attack. The considered platoon can exploit direct or undirected
data transfer links among the cars. The equilibrium of the defined game determines the
optimal policy which has to be used by the detector to deploy the monitoring sensors to
increase the security level of the system. This chapter also studies the effect of adding
(or removing) communication links between vehicles on the game value. The simulation
and experimental results conducted on a vehicle platoon setup using Robotic Operating
System (ROS) demonstrate the effectiveness of the performed analyses.
In Chapter 4, we propose a general approach to find an optimal actuator placement
strategy according to the Stackelberg game between the attacker and the defender. The
game payoff is the energy needed by the attacker to steer the consensus follower-leader
dynamics of the system towards his desired direction. The attacker tries to minimize this
energy while the defender attempts to maximize it. Thus, based on the defined game
and its optimal equilibrium point, the defender(s) selects optimal actuator placement ac-
tion to face the attacker(s). Both cases of single attacker–single defender and multiple
attackers–multiple defenders cases are investigated. Furthermore, we study the effects
of different information flow topologies, namely the unidirectional and bidirectional data
transfer structures. Besides, the impacts of increasing the connectivity among the nodes
on the security level of the platoon are presented. Simulation results for h–nearest neigh-
bor platoon formations along with experimental results using the scaled cars governed by
Robotic Operating System (ROS) verify the effectiveness of the method.
Chapter 5 proposes a secure distributed nonlinear model predictive control algorithm
consisting of i) detection and ii) mitigation phases. The algorithm is capable of handling
DoS attack performed on a platoon equipped by different communication topologies and at
the same time it guarantees the desired formation control performance. Stability analysis of
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the attacked platoon running the given algorithm is also presented. Simulation results on a
sample heterogeneous attacked platoon exploiting two-predecessor follower communication
environment demonstrates the effectiveness of the method.
Chapter 6 extends the method given in Chapter 5 which is also capable of providing
safe and secure control of dynamic platoons in which arbitrary vehicles might perform
cut-in and/or cut-out maneuvers. Convergence time and stability analysis of the system
are also investigated in some cases. Furthermore, to handle DoS attacks modeled by an
exceeding time delay in inter-vehicular data transmission, we propose the integration of an
Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) design within the controller resulting in a novel Secure–
DNMPC–UKF co-design. This, in essence, estimates the delayed system states and feeds
the predicted values to the Secure–DNMPC, which efficiently mitigates the attack effects.
Simulation results demonstrate the fruitfulness of the proposed method.
Finally Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and summarizes the presented contributions. It
also presents some possible open avenues for further research.
9
Chapter 2
Literature Review and Background
2.1 Basics of Vehicle Platooning
2.1.1 Background
Safe and secure driving experience is one of the most significant objectives in recently
emerging intelligent transportation systems [41, 42]. Evolution of smart and autonomous
vehicles has highlighted this concern much more than the past decades [43]. On the other
hand, the possibility of featuring the connectivity and cooperation of vehicles has led to the
emergence of strings of connected vehicles, namely platoons. Platoons have provided the
opportunity to enhance the driving safety, ecological performance, road throughput, and
comfort level [15, 26, 44–50]. Current standards for vehicular communications enable cars
to exchange data, such as inter-vehicular distance, speed, and acceleration among each
other through different communication environments, namely Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V),
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle-to-Cloud (V2C), Vehicle-to-Broadband (V2B), and
Vehicle-to-Roadside (V2R) [51, 52]. V2V communications can provide direct data trans-
fer with a much lower delay compared to radars [21] and enable vehicles to drive closely
with short inter-vehicular distances. This will increase the amount of road throughput
and reduce the need for developing more road network. In this context, Cooperative
Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) has been widely developed featuring the possibility of
coordination between connected vehicles which aims to enhance the fuel efficiency, safety,
driving comfort, and road throughput [21, 28, 53–60]. Different types of controllers such
as model predictive control [61], and decentralized overlapping control [62], have been











Figure 2.1: Unidirectional topology: (a) PF, (b) PLF, (c) TPF, and (d) TPLF, (vehicle 0
is the Leader Vehicle (LV))
experience [61,63,64]. Platoons could be formed based on different spacing policies and can
be governed by different formation control techniques such as traditional linear/nonlinear
controllers, optimal control methods, and more advanced consensus algorithms [65–67].
Getting more developed through using more effective data communication structures, con-
nected vehicles are equipped with different information flow topologies to facilitate and
improve the efficacy of data transfers. Predecessor-follower (PF), predecessor-leader fol-
lower (PLF), two-predecessors follower (TPF), two-predecessors-leader follower (TPLF),
all-predecessors follower (APF), all-predecessors-leader follower (APLF), and h–nearest
neighbor are some of the instances [68, 69]. These structures can be exploited either in a
unidirectional or a bidirectional data transmit (see Fig. 2.1).
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2.1.2 Vehicular Communication Standards and DSRC
In vehicle platooning, there have been some studies that investigated interaction protocols
and standards for data sharing [30,31]. Other researches have also considered degradation
and communication loss of data transfers affecting the CACC performance [70, 71]. Gen-
erally, several important variants of wireless data transfer systems exploited in connected
vehicles include DSRC, VANET, and MANET [72–74]. DSRC, which was developed by
the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), has been leveraged as one of the
communication methods for V2X communications as an inter-vehicular communication
infrastructure, and is largely based on IEEE 802.11p, which uses Carrier-Sense Multiple
Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol. It was initially developed to op-
erate on a 912 MHz bandwidth channel in 1992. In 2002 and 2003, it was improved as the
particular standard used in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) using IEEE 802.11a
operating on the 5.9 GHz band denoted by E2203-02 and E2203-03, respectively [75]. Re-
cently, this protocol, which is also called the Wireless Access in the Vehicular Environment
(WAVE), is established to manage the data transfers in the 5.9 GHz band on seven different
channels of 75 MHz bandwidth [76, 77]. Each channel is 10 MHz wide along with 5 MHz
reserved before the channels. For more details of DSRC and other protocols, the reader is
referred to [76,77] and references therein.
2.2 Cyber Attacks on Vehicle Platoons
Despite plenty of benefits resulting from the use of wireless communications in a platoon,
it is naturally vulnerable to cyber attacks. Different types of attacks on a platoon can
be generally classified into three classes, namely application layer attacks, network layer
attacks, and privacy leakage attacks [78]. All these attacks can potentially endanger the
string stability of the platoon. Moreover, the attacker could be an external or an internal
malicious agent performing each of the above-mentioned attacks [79]. For details of the
aforementioned attacks, the reader is referred to [78]. False data injection attack (mes-
sage falsification/tampering), replay attack, zero dynamics attack, covert attack, jamming
attack, eavesdropping attack, Man-in-the-Middle attack, GPS spoofing, impersonation at-
tack, masquerading attack, and Denial-of-Service (DoS) are some of the possible real-world
attacks on vehicle platoons [80–83]. We will focus on bias injection attack (Chapters 3 and
4), and DoS attack (Chapters 5 and 6) as common forms of disruption attacks [84, 85].
Another attack classification in literature splits the attacks into control algorithm modifi-
cation and sensor reading tampering classes [79]. Control algorithm modification attacks
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Figure 2.2: CAN bus connecting different internal vehicle components [91]
include destabilizing attacks [86], high-speed collision induction attacks [87], and traffic
flow instability attacks [88, 89]. Sensor reading tampering attacks consist of false data
injection [90] and efficiency-motivated attacks [82].
It is notable that the vulnerability of a platoon against attacks can also arise from
insecure individual vehicles participating in the platoon. Therefore, securing single vehicles
individually is also essential to ensure the security of the connected vehicles in a platoon.
In this respect, a means of attacks on a single vehicle is to exploit the vulnerability of a
component of the vehicle allowing access to its Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. For
instance, in several real car attacks occurred recently, the infotainment component of the
vehicle that required no authentication and could be accessed anonymously, was exploited
aiming at getting access to the CAN bus of the vehicle thereby attaining control on different
operations of the car, such as steering wheel, engine, and braking system (see Fig. 2.2).
For a comprehensive list of real-world attacks happened on vehicles from 2010 up to 2017
together with several countermeasures, the reader is referred to [92]. In the sequel, we take
a look at the practical considerations and a more detailed classification of cyber attacks
imposed on single and connected vehicles.
2.2.1 Practical Considerations
In this section, we will go through further in the details of practical aspects of possible
cyber attacks on vehicle platoons. We discuss different attack classifications and explain
the practical issues that might occur while the attacks are performing.
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Figure 2.3: Insecure Combox used in BMW attack [94]
Under-the-Hood Elements
From a practical point of view, there are several different components in a vehicle which
can be under the risk of attacks. Under-the-hood elements, such as ECUs, vehicular
network, and the communication gateway are some of these components [93]. An attacker
can exploit possible existing backdoors of an ECU. Running operating systems (to handle
high burden functionalities), ECUs cannot close all the intrusion vulnerabilities of a typical
operating system. Besides, the manufacturers have to leave some open tunnels in ECUs
for diagnostic purposes. These limitations can be abused by an adversary for devastation
objectives.
Vehicular Networks
Vehicular networks are other components which need to pay sufficient care to during and
after manufacture. Typically, these networks are designed such that they remain isolated
from an outer world like the Internet and hence developed mostly to operate in closed
networks. Thus, in principle, they lack security protections and are proper backdoors for
the attacker to penetrate the internal vehicle operations.
Gateways
Gateways are the connection bridges between vehicular networks and standard communi-
cation protocols, such as Bluetooth or WiFi. BMW ConnectedDrive attack is a real-world
cyber attack suffered from an insecure employed gateway in the vehicular networks [94].
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Mainly, the adversary could exploit the vulnerability in the modem of the Combox shown
in Fig. 2.3 to unlock the car. It is noteworthy that the Combox was mainly designed as an
infotainment unit which is also responsible for the handling of emergency calls. Generally,
in case the gateways use their own operating systems, a spoofing attacker can replace the
operating system with his own software. Moreover, as the gateways are the point where
communication protocols and vehicular networks meet, a Denial-of-Service or Man-in-the-
Middle attack1 can break this connectivity resulting in performance degradation. For the
details regarding the vulnerabilities of mobile devices and communications used in vehicles,
the reader is referred to [93] and references therein.
As was mentioned before different types of attacks on a platoon can be generally clas-
sified in terms of the level of the platoon architecture on which the attack is imposed or
based on the security issue they raise [78,79]. In the following, we explain different attack
classifications in detail. Fig. 2.4 illustrates different possible attacks in connection with
different internal vehicle parts.
2.2.2 Application-Layer, Network-Layer, System-Level and Pri-
vacy Leakage Attacks
In this section, we study different types of attacks that might occur in vehicle platoons
in practice. We present a classification of attacks in terms of the level of the platoon
architecture on which the attack is imposed. This classification subdivides the attacks into
four main classes, namely application layer attacks, network-layer attacks, system-level
attacks, and privacy leakage attacks [78].
Application Layer Attacks
Several important variants of wireless data transfer systems exploited in connected vehicles
include DSRC, VANET, and MANET [72, 73]. DSRC has been leveraged as a standard
protocol for inter-vehicular communication infrastructures.2 This protocol is established
to manage the data transfers in the 5.9 GHz band on a 75 MHz bandwidth channel [77,
95]. For the details of other protocols, the reader is referred to [51, 52] and references
therein. Application layer attacks can endanger the functionality of the aforementioned
protocols and other applications, such as CACC message beaconing in the data sharing
protocols. Message falsification, GPS spoofing, and replay attacks lie under this class.
1Details of such attacks will be explained subsequently.
2There have been some studies that investigated interaction protocols for data sharing [30,31].
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Figure 2.4: Different internal vehicle components and possible attacks [93]
Application layer attacks can surely degrade the string stability of the platoon and might
cause accidents.
In message falsification attack, the attacker starts listening to a beacon in the wireless
medium and then rebroadcasts the falsified version of the received messages. For instance,
the adversary can manipulate the received acceleration of a preceding vehicle and transfer
the modified value to the following cars.
Spoofing attack relates to impersonation of the attacker aiming at injecting fraudulent
data to the other vehicles. As an example, consider a predecessor-follower communication
topology among the platoon. Having performed the spoofing mechanism, the adversary
impersonates himself as the preceding vehicle of the target one and starts sharing incorrect
data to the follower. This, in turn, causes the propagation of false data through the platoon
resulting in hazardous actions or even accidents.
In a replay attack, the attacker receives and stores the data and replays it at a later
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time. The replayed data contains old values which are no longer valid in the new platoon
situation. Assume that the platoon speed was already 100 km/h which is received and
stored by the attacker. When the leader slows down to 70 km/h, the attacker replays the
previously stored value of 100 km/h to the followers causing hazardous collisions.
Network Layer Attacks
A network layer attack is mainly related to DoS or Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks.
In these attacks, the communication capability of the vehicles in the platoon is subject
to overwhelm. Particularly, in the existing network between the vehicles there exists a
specified component called Hardware Security Module (HSM) which is responsible for
storing digital keys as well as performing all cryptographic operations, such as message
signing/verification, encryption, and hashing. The HSM can handle a limited number of the
aforementioned tasks at a time as they are computationally complex and require massive
computational power. Hence, the DoS attack can target this limitation to overwhelm the
communication capability of the platoon.
Radio jamming is another DoS attack that aims communication protocols such as com-
monly used IEEE 802.11p standard. Specifically, this standard uses one control channel
(CCH) with multiple service channels (SCHs). The adversary can use different jamming
techniques like one-channel jamming or swiping between all channels and trying to jam
them all.
System Level Attacks
The previous attacks are all to manipulate the data transfer mechanism in the wireless
infrastructures. On the other hand, the system level attacks, are related to manipulation
of hardware/software of the vehicles. This can be generally done by an insider at the
manufacturing level or by an outsider in an unattended vehicle (e.g., by replacing or altering
certain vehicle sensors). The significance of this kind of attacks is apparent, i.e., even if the
V2V communications among the vehicles are error-free and completely secure, the on-board
hardware/software of the vehicles can still be tampered causing performance degradation.
Privacy Leakage Attacks
Through the transferred data between the vehicles, there might be private data containing
valuable information about the platoon formations. These data can be the platoon length,
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Figure 2.5: Different attack types in a vehicle platoon: a) Falsification attack; b) Eaves-
dropping attack; c) Radio jamming attack; d) Tampering attack [78]
the vehicles’ identity participating in the formation, and the intended speed/acceleration
of the platoon. Consequently, preserving data privacy is another concern which can be
threatened by malicious agents. Privacy leakage attacks can even happen easier in case
the data exchanged among the platoon are signed allowing the adversary to easily identify
the participating vehicles in the CACC stream.
Eavesdropping is a passive attack abusing the above-mentioned limitations and vulner-
abilities. These attacks can be avoided by encryption and/or anonymity techniques using
group signatures or short-term certificates (pseudonyms) [96, 97]. Fig. 2.5 illustrates the
above-mentioned attacks schematically.
2.2.3 Data-Related vs. Control-Based Attacks
Another interesting attack classification is based on the security issue they raise [79]. From
this perspective, the attacks can be split into two main categories. The first category
consists of vehicular network attacks which are related to data threatening. They can be
categorized into four major classes, namely the attacks that cause missing data availability,
those causing missing data confidentiality, attacks aiming at missing data authentication,
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and attacks resulting in losing data integrity. The second category comprises the attacks
that endanger the platoon control systems. This category is comprised of attacks whether
they put control algorithms or sensor readings under risk.
Data-Related Attacks
Data-related attacks largely threaten the vehicular network of the platoon. In particular,
they can be classified as follows,
1. Missing data availability
• Jamming attack
• DoS
2. Missing data confidentiality
• Eavesdropping attack
• Man-in-the-Middle attack





4. Losing data integrity
• Replay attack
• Message modification attack
Control-Based Attacks
Control-based attacks mainly endanger the platoon control systems. They can be classified
as follows,
1. Control algorithm modification
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• Destabilizing attack
• High-speed collision induction attack
• Traffic flow instability attack
2. Sensor reading tampering
• False data injection attack
• Efficiency-motivated attack
2.3 Secure Vehicle Platooning
Back to the platoons, an adversarial attacker can target one or several vehicles to physi-
cally/remotely manipulate the sensors of the vehicles which can eventually cause hazardous
actions or even accidents. This signifies the importance of security of the vehicle platoons
against external malicious attacks. Hence, the need for monitoring systems capable of
detecting the attackers’ action is highly sensible [98–104]. One of the important aspects of
deployed monitoring sensors is their location regarding the possible locations of injected
attacks. Consequently, it is largely essential to have a systematic procedure based on which
the detector can place its sensors on specific locations to increase the security level of the
system.
Recently, much research has been done in investigating the security of networked control
systems from various perspectives [105–109]. Communication-related protection methods,
such as encryption of wireless channels, are techniques to avoid receiving compromised data
via the wireless infrastructures [52]. On the other hand, control-oriented concepts, such as
game-theoretic methods are also among the leading methodologies which address the secu-
rity issue of general cyber-physical systems with a considerable amount of care [110, 111].
Various approaches, such as Nash or Stackelberg formulations, demonstrate the conflicting
decisions between the players (attackers and defenders) [112,113]. The existence of an equi-
librium state for this game is a solution based on which the detector can decide about its
sensor placement strategy. Cooperative games are some other recent approaches aiming at
modeling networked control systems [114]. Based on these games, robustness analysis of the
system against malicious attacks has also been studied [115–117]. With respect to securing
communication protocols used in platoons, secure communication protocols for VANETs
based on game theory have been proposed either for multimedia transmission [118] or for
communications exposed to specific attacks [119]. Network-aware control methods have
also been proposed to handle possible communication failures through the platoon. Those
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approaches mainly consider random communication failures with an emphasis on the con-
trol/stability performance of the whole platoon without considering intelligent cyber at-
tacks [120–122]. Despite the above-mentioned works, a general procedure for investigation
of security of vehicle platoons under cyber attacks in which the quality of communications
among the vehicles are different is missing and has not been addressed yet. Game-theoretic
approaches provide a powerful tool to tackle the attacker-detector conflicting actions as an
attacker-detector game and study the security of a platoon based on various decisions made
by the adversarial and the defender. Hence, one of the contribution of the current thesis
is to formulate the security problem of a general platoon, which is under cyber attacks, as
a game where both the attacker and the defender attempt to face each other in opposite
ways. Moreover, the communication links between different vehicles can have different
qualities and both the unidirectional and bidirectional data transfer structures are taken
into account in this work. More rigorously, the adversary tries to attack specific vehicles
of the platoon such that he remains undetected while the defender endeavors to locate his
sensors on specific vehicles such that the detectability of the attacker is maximized, hence,
increases the security level of the system.
As was mentioned before, vehicle platoons lie under a wide class of newly emerged
systems, namely Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). When CPS comes into view, control,
computation, and networking bind together to form a suitable infrastructure for control and
systems purposes. Having taken advantage of networking and wireless communications,
CPS could develop a vast range of large scale widespread control systems. However, this
might bring up a substantial challenge, which is the vulnerability of CPS against cyber
attacks [7]. Although there has been a large amount of research addressing the security
of CPS, those systems still suffer from the lack of secure performance in the presence of
possible malicious intruders [109, 123, 124]. This should also be noted that although some
techniques introduced in the fault-tolerant control are applicable to security problems,
most of them have been shown to fail to mitigate the effects of an attack [125]. This is
due to the fact that an attacker is intrinsically an intelligent agent who might have some
a priori knowledge about the system dynamics and the controller contrary to a random
fault. Furthermore, an intelligent adversary might target specific components of a system
based on his own criteria, such as optimizing the amount of consumed energy or the
intended level of devastation. In this respect, various system-theoretic, graph-theoretic,
and game-theoretic approaches [111, 126–128] have been proposed in the last decade to
address security issues of general control systems. Vehicle platoons, as a large class of CPS,
incorporate the physical dynamical systems, referred to as the physical layer, along with the
wireless communication systems indicating the cyber layer [15]. Therefore, these systems
need to guarantee a safe and secure performance in the case of dealing with unreliable and
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Figure 2.6: Cyber attack classification in a three-dimensions attack space [84]
compromised networks. In recent years, researchers have been concerned about possible
vulnerabilities of vehicle platoons against cyber attacks as well as communication delays
[46,70,71,83,86,122,129–135]. For instance, in [129], a DoS attack detection and estimation
scheme based on sliding mode observer has been proposed for a linear homogeneous car
following system. Also, authors of [70, 71] study the performance degradation of a linear
homogeneous vehicle following controller caused by unreliable wireless communications.
Various types of intrusions imposed by either insider or outsider adversary on connected
vehicles such as GPS spoofing, DoS, masquerading, insider/outsider eavesdropping have
been investigated in literature [136]. Each of these attacks can degrade system performance
by violating one or more of the data integrity, data availability, and data confidentiality
(see Fig. 2.6). A detailed and formal attack classification in a three-dimensions attack
space is presented in [84]. Hence, one of the most prominent aspects of vehicle platooning
is to ensure its security while one (or more) intruder(s) intend to devastate the performance
of the platoon by injecting attack signals to one or more components of the system [93].
The injected attack signal could be of a physical one affecting the dynamical quantities
of the vehicles or any deterioration of the communication framework existing among the
nodes. Adversarial attackers can even access the control of the vehicles remotely, hence,
largely endanger the safety of the platoon. For instance, false data injected by a replay
intruder, which seems admissible to the system and the controller, might cause violation
of the safe desired gap among consecutive vehicles and result in severe accidents [78].
As another example, in GPS spoofing, legitimate GPS signals are interfered with by the
attacker who transmits inaccurate coordinates. This will fool the controller of an ego-
22
vehicle; thus, incorrect torque input is applied to the wheels, which might cause collisions.
The vulnerability of a platoon against attacks can also be caused by insecure individual
vehicles participating in the platoon. Thus, securing single vehicles individually is also
essential to ensure the security of the connected vehicles as a whole. In this regard, a
possible means of attack on a single vehicle could be to exploit the vulnerability of one of
the components of the vehicle allowing access to its CAN bus [137]. This has been the case
in several real car attacks occurred recently [92]. For instance, the attacker might access
remotely to the CAN bus of the car through unauthorized infotainment facility, thereby
take the full control of acceleration or braking operations [138].
Over the recent years, researchers have introduced algorithms to overcome the secu-
rity threats of connected vehicles with different approaches [78]. For instance, [139] views
the problem by capturing the control-theoretic methods to address the resiliency of the
connected vehicles against the adversary. Encryption of the data transmitted through the
platoon, Quality of Service (QoS), and safety awareness of the vehicles are other techniques
that have been exploited to address the privacy leakage of a platoon [41,80,140,141]. Fur-
thermore, safety issues that may arise due to possible malfunctioning of some redundant
sensing/communication devices installed on the vehicles have been addressed in litera-
ture [142, 143]. Observer-based techniques have also been introduced to tackle the packet
drop phenomenon in the network among the vehicles without compromising the overall
performance [129]. Besides, game-theoretic approaches, in some instances interlaced with
graph-theoretic techniques, have been shown in several paradigms to be quite fruitful to
confront the security issues of control systems [111,114,132,144–146]. For instance, authors
in [111], employed a game-theoretic framework to confront the jamming attack threatening
remote state estimation in general CPS. In [146] the minimum relative distance among two
consecutive vehicles is derived based on a game-theoretical optimal control scheme. The
authors have verified that this minimum safe distance heavily depends on the maximum
deceleration ability of the follower vehicle. In [145], the authors study the optimal control
action for a standard discrete-time linear quadratic Gaussian system in the presence of an
intelligent intruder, who jams the communication link among the controller and the plant,
by defining Nash/Stackelberg game problems. It is worth mentioning that Stackelberg
game formulation is more applicable to most of the security problems [147]. This is due
to the fact that in most of these problems the leader (usually the defender) designs his
strategy based on a possible worst case attack scenario that can be reasonably captured
by the Stackelberg game. Besides, these games always admit an equilibrium point which
determines the optimal strategy for the defender, hence, guarantees the existence of a so-
lution for the defender. In [114], the evolution of the networked control system is cast as
a consensus model within the cooperative games in order to apply the potential games to
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cooperative control problems. Those cooperative games were also investigated in terms
of their resiliency against the communication failures imposed by an intruder [148, 149].
As such, vehicle platooning equipped by inter-vehicular data connectivities and formation
controllers could inherently benefit from the mentioned literature to address the security
challenges during attacks performed by an external adversarial attacker.
To date, there is no systematic and general procedure to mitigate the intelligent attack
effects imposed on a platoon with arbitrary internal communication topology and forma-
tions. In fact, the current literature suffers from the lack of a general work-around for
secure platooning which is independent of the employed communication topology, number
of attackers, and attack location. This is what we are going to address in the current thesis
from both the high level and low level perspectives.
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Part I





Placement in Vehicle Platooning
In this chapter, we study the security of a vehicle platoon exposed to cyber attacks using a
game-theoretic approach. The platoon topologies under investigation are directed (called
predecessor following) or undirected (bidirectional) weighted graphs. The edge weights
specify the quality of the communication links between the vehicles in both the unidi-
rectional/bidirectional data transfer environments. The attacker-detector game is defined
as follows. The attacker targets some vehicles in the platoon to attack and the detector
deploys monitoring sensors on the vehicles. The attacker’s objective is to be as stealthy to
the sensors as possible while the detector tries to place the monitoring sensors to detect
the attack impact as much as it can. The existence of Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies
for this game is investigated based on which the detector can choose specific vehicles to put
his sensors on and increase the security level of the system. We benefit from the system
L2-gain from the attack signal to the sensor measurements vector to characterize the cost
function introduced in the game and determine the optimal sensor placement strategy.
Moreover, we study the effect of adding (or removing) communication links between vehi-
cles on the game value. The simulation and experimental results conducted on a vehicle
platoon setup using Robotic Operating System (ROS) demonstrate the effectiveness of our
analyses. Explicitly, our contributions in this chapter are as follows,
• For both predecessor-following (directed) platoon and symmetric (undirected) pla-
toon, we investigate the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy for an attacker-
detector game based on which the detector can place its sensors on specific nodes
increasing the security level of the system. We consider the case of single attacked
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vehicle, f = 1, as well as multiple attacked vehicles, f > 1, where f is the number
of attacked nodes and deployed sensors on the network (Theorem 3.8, Theorem 3.10,
Theorem 3.11, Theorem 3.12).
• We study the effects of adding or removing communication links (or weights) to (or
from) the platoon on the game pay-off. Both undirected and directed scenarios will
be investigated in this study, and we show that the behaviour of the game value in
response to such topology variations is different for directed and undirected networks
(Theorem 3.14, Theorem 3.15).
• The security level of a platoon equipped with undirected communication links among
its vehicles will be compared to that of a platoon equipped with directed communica-
tion links. Our results show that using undirected data transfer increases the security
level of the system which is consistent with the fact that the two-way data transfer
between the pairs of vehicles lets them receive the attack signal from multiple ways
instead of a single path, hence, resulting in a more reliable platoon (Proposition 3.17).
The results of this chapter have been published in [132].
3.1 Organization of the Chapter
This chapter is organized as follows. Sec. 3.2 defines the problem formulation of a platoon
under cyber attacks. The attacker-detector game is defined and the system and attack
modeling are presented in this section. In Sec. 3.3 we perform the equilibrium analysis
for both the weighted undirected and directed data transfer scenarios where the attacker
attacks one node and the detector places one sensor on a node. Sec. 3.4 extends the re-
sults to the case where more than one nodes are attacked and more than one monitoring
sensors are supposed to be deployed. In Sec. 3.5 effects of adding extra communication
links to a platoon are studied. Security level of a platoon with bidirectional versus unidi-
rectional communication links is investigated in Sec. 3.6. Sec. 3.7 presents the simulation
and experimental results. Finally, Sec. 3.8 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Problem Formulation
First of all, we present the notations and definitions used in the rest of the chapter for the
sake of legibility.
27
3.2.1 Notations and Definitions
We denote a weighted undirected graph by Gu(V ,W) where V is the set of nodes (vertices)
and W is the set of undirected edge weights. Assume |V| = n. We note that wij ≥ 0 for
all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n and wii = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We say that (vi, vj) is an edge if and
only if wij > 0. The leader node in a path graph is denoted by v`. For simplicity we define
the weight of edge (vi, vj) by wj if vi is closer to the leader node. We denote a weighted
directed graph by Gd(V ,W). We assume only unidirectional edges for the directed graphs,
i.e., if there exists a directed edge from vi to vj in Gd, then there is no directed edge from
vj to vi. The adjacency matrix of Gd is An×n where Aij = wi if and only if there is an
edge from vj to vi. The neighbor nodes of vertex vi ∈ V in Gd are determined by the set
Ni = {vj ∈ V | (vj, vi) ∈ Gd}. The in-degree of node vi (degree for undirected networks)
is determined by di = Σvj∈NiAij. The Laplacian matrix of a general graph G is defined
as L = D − A, where D = diag(d1, . . . , dn). It is noteworthy that since we consider a
general weighted graph, the degree matrix does not measure the number of outgoing and
incoming edges, hence, does not only take values from the natural domain. In this chapter,
we denote a vector which has a one in the ith position and zero elsewhere by ei.
3.2.2 System Modeling
Let us consider a string of n connected vehicles in a platoon modeled by a weighted path
graph G(V ,W). The edge weights are to model the communication quality between the
vehicles. In practice, different scenarios could occur affecting the quality of data transfer
between the vehicles.1 It is notable that in DSRC-based communications, it is common to
normalize the communication perfection of signals versus the sent power or distance. Hence,
from a practical point of view, the edge weights used in this chapter can be normalized
based on the above concepts to let the weight values lie in the [0, 1] range; however, this
is out of the scope of this chapter. Let pi denote the position of vehicle vi. The objective
is for each vehicle to maintain a specific distance from its neighbors. The desired vehicle
formation will be formed by a specific constant distance ∆ij between vehicles vi and vj,
which should satisfy ∆ij = ∆ik +∆kj for every triple {vi, vk, vj} ⊂ V . Considering the fact
that each vehicle vi has access to its own position, the positions of its neighbors, and the




kp (pj(t)− pi(t) +∆ij) + kv (ṗj(t)− ṗi(t)) + ζi(t), (3.1)
1For instance, entering the platoon in a long tunnel may degrade the proper data transfer among the
vehicles [150–153].
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where kp, kv > 0 are control gains and ζi(t) models the injected attacks. Physically, this
means that the attacker adds a traction acceleration (or brake) to vehicle vi. Dynamics (3.1)






















where x = [P Ṗ]T = [p1, p2, . . . , pn, ṗ1, ṗ2, . . . , ṗn]




j∈Ni ∆ij. Here Lg is the grounded Laplacian matrix which is the reduced Laplacian
matrix by removing the row and the column corresponding to the leader node, y(t) is the
sensor measurements vector, and ζ(t) is the attack vector. Matrices B and C represent
the attacker and detector decisions, respectively. For instance, let us consider a specific
vehicle platoon with n = 4 vehicles subject to cyber attacks shown in Fig. 3.1. Suppose
that the attacker targets vehicles v1 and v2 while the detector places its sensors on vehicles
v3 and v4. This gives B =
[
1 0 0 0




0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
]
. The reason that the
positions of vehicles are our output of interest is that we need the vehicles’ positions to
guarantee the desired inter-vehicular distance in terms of safety of the platoon. These data
are available through both GPS and on-board sensors of the vehicles. In order to prevent
a possible misconception that might arise due to the usage of the word “sensor” for the
defender’s action, we state that this is the exact same means to measure the output of the
system. Based on (3.6), the output of the system is the relative position of the vehicles.
To measure the position of the ego-vehicle, this quantity can be measured by the sensors
mounted on it such as a GPS. To measure the relative position of the other vehicles,
different commonly used sensors can be utilized such as radar and Light Detection and
Ranging (LIDAR) sensor. An example of undirected and directed platoons of n vehicles
subject to two attacks and equipped with two monitoring detectors are shown in Fig. 3.1.
For the rest of our analysis, we derive a model for the error dynamics of the system
(3.2). Let us denote the desired position of vehicle vi in steady state by p
∗
i (t) and define
the following tracking error
p̃i(t) , pi(t)− p∗i (t). (3.3)
Obviously, the desired formation of the platoon has to satisfy p∗i (t) = p
∗
j(t) +∆ij [155].





















(a) Weighted undirected platoon with n vehicles
(b) Weighted directed platoon with n vehicles
Figure 3.1: Undirected and directed platoons with n vehicles and sample attackers and
monitoring sensors
Now respecting the fact that in the steady state formation the vehicles’ velocities have
to be equal, we observe that ṗ∗i (t)− ṗ∗j(t) = 0. Furthermore, in the steady state formation
the vehicles’ velocities reach constant values which results in p̈∗i (t) = 0. Hence, (3.4) is


























where x̃ = [P̃ ˙̃P]T = [p̃1, p̃2, . . . , p̃n, ˙̃p1, ˙̃p2, . . . , ˙̃pn]
T and the other variables are the same
as in (3.2).
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3.2.3 Attack Modeling: Bias Injection Attacks
For our particular application under study, i.e., vehicle platooning, we assume that the
attacker does not inject a high frequency signal to the system. In fact, due to the large
inertia of the vehicles, the attacker can not change the vehicle’s acceleration abruptly.
Hence, a high frequency attack signal which targets at changing the vehicle’s acceleration
can be immediately detected through receiving the information from the surrounding ve-
hicles. Based on this fact, we consider a slowly time varying attack signal, namely a bias
injection attack. Consequently, the L2-gain of the system which equals the H∞-norm of
the system [156] can be calculated at the zero frequency.
Based on (3.6), the following proposition, formulates the system L2-gain from the attack
vector ζ(t) to the output measurements vector ỹ(t).
Proposition 3.1. The system L2-gain from the attack vector ζ(t) to the output measure-












where σmax is the maximum singular value and the L2-norm of a signal x is ‖x‖22 ,∫∞
0
xTxdt. 
Proof: Taking the Laplace transform from the second row of (3.6) yields
s2P̃ (s) = −kpLgP̃ (s)− skvLgP̃ (s) +BZ(s), (3.8)
where P̃ (s) and Z(s) are the Laplace transform of P̃ and ζ(t), respectively. Moreover,
taking the Laplace transform from the second equation of (3.6) gives
Ỹ (s) = CP̃ (s) = C
(





which completes the proof. 
We define an attacker-detector game as follows. The attacker chooses f vehicles to
attack such that L2-gain from attack signal to monitoring nodes is minimized. On the
other hand the detector chooses f vehicles to monitor such that L2-gain from attack signal
to monitoring nodes is maximized.
Remark 3.2. It is common in the literature that the defender (here detector) knows an
upper bound of the attacked nodes [157]. Here, we assume that f is an upper bound of
the attacked nodes, and hence, the detector acts based on this worst-case scenario. 
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Based on Proposition 3.1, the cost function that the attacker tries to minimize and the
detector tries to maximize is defined as follows








It is proved in the literature that when the graph G is connected (which holds for a
platoon that is a line graph), then Lg is nonsingular and L
−1
g is nonegative elementwise
[158].
Remark 3.3. The proposed approach in this chapter is basically considered as a centralized
one. In particular, as in (3.10), the global knowledge of the variables of the Laplacian
matrix need to be known for the game pay-off to be fully defined. The elements of L−1g are
determined based on the special form of this matrix according to the exploited information
flow topology. This will be explained in Lemma 3.5 and 3.6. 
The following lemma will be needed in the subsequent attacker-detector game analyses.
Lemma 3.4 ([159]). For a non-negative matrix, A, the largest singular value is a non-
decreasing function of its elements. Besides, if A is irreducible, then the largest singular
value is a strictly increasing function of its entries. 
3.3 Single Attacked–Single Detecting Vehicles
In this section, we investigate the existence of an equilibrium point of the attacker-detector
game in both undirected and directed cases where there is only one attacked node. To this
end, we first present explicit representations of L−1g for both of these scenarios in the two
following lemmas, respectively. The proof of these results are presented in the Appendix.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose that Gu is a weighted undirected path graph and let Pi` be the set of









Lemma 3.6. Suppose that Gd is a weighted directed path graph with the leader node v`.





if there is a directed path from j to i,




Remark 3.7. In case f = 1 where the attacker attacks node j and the detector places its
sensor on node i, i.e., B = ej and C = e
T
i for some 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the game pay-off is



















where [L−1g ]ij is the ij
th element of L−1g . 
The following result presents the existence of an equilibrium point in a weighted undi-
rected path graph.
Theorem 3.8. Let Gu be a weighted undirected path graph with v` as the leader node in
one end of the graph. Assume that the weight of an incoming edge from v` to node i is wi.
The game between the attacker and the detector has at least one NE and the game value is
1
w1
where w1 is the weight of the incoming edge to the leader’s neighbor node v1. 
Proof: The NE pertains to the scenario in which the attacker attacks the leader’s
neighbor node. This fact is easily derived based on Lemma 3.5. In fact, the attacker
tries to minimize the game objective by attacking the nearest node to the leader so as
to regardless of the detection node, the number of common nodes from the leader to the
attacked and defended nodes is minimized (which will be 1 in this case). Hence, regardless
of the detector’s action, the game admits at least one NE with the same game value, i.e.,
1
w1
where node 1 is the leader’s neighbor. Besides, if the attacker chooses any other nodes,
the game pay-off will be at least 1
w1
. 
Remark 3.9. In Theorem 3.8, one of the NEs happens where the detector places its sensor
on the farthest node from the leader. This is a particular case on which we will focus in
the rest of the chapter. 
The following result presents the existence of an equilibrium point in a platoon equipped
with directed communication links modeled by a weighted directed path graph.
Theorem 3.10. Let Gd be a weighted directed path graph with v` as the leader node in one
end of the graph. Assume that the weight of an incoming edge from v` to node i is wi. Then,
the game between the attacker and the detector admits an NE in node vk = arg maxi∈W wi.

Proof: Without loss of generality, let us denote the ordering of the nodes starting
from the leader and ending at the end of the platoon by v`, v1, v2, . . . , vn. Having in mind
that in the case of a directed graph, L−1g is a lower-triangular matrix, we try to find the
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equilibrium point of the attacker-detector game. We know that, based on Lemma 3.6, the








· · · 1
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]
. One can perceive that for the detector
to maximize the game objective, he definitely chooses the last row of L−1g to assure there is
no zero entry in the chosen row. On the other hand, the attacker has no other way except
choosing the minimum entry of the aforementioned row. This entry corresponds to the
node with the maximum incoming weight which completes the proof. 
3.4 Attacker–Detector Game: f > 1 Case
Due to the availability of redundant on-board sensors on most of the vehicles from one
hand, and that the attacker typically tends to attack more than one vehicle of the platoon
to achieve a higher level of devastation from the other hand, it is more crucial for the
detector to benefit from the sensor redundancy and be prepared for such attacks. In these
attacks, the attacker targets more than one vehicle, and the detector is supposed to deploy
more than one monitoring sensor. Hence, we extend our previous results and analyze the
existence of an equilibrium point of the attacker-detector game in both undirected and
directed cases where there are more than one attacked nodes.
The following result presents the existence of an equilibrium point in a weighted undi-
rected path graph with multiple attacked nodes and multiple deployed sensors.
Theorem 3.11. Let Gu be a weighted undirected path graph with v` as the leader node in
one end of the path. Then for any f > 1, the attacker-detector game described by the game
pay-off (3.10) admits at least one NE happening when the attacker chooses f closest nodes
to the leader and the detector chooses f farthest nodes from the leader. 
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 (3.14)
Based on the specific structure of (3.14), i.e., the entries monotonically increase as we
go further in rows/columns, the NE occurs when the attacker chooses the first f columns
of L−1g and the detector chooses the last f rows of it. Denoting the so-called columns and








∗) ≤ σmax(C∗L−1g B∗) ≤ σmax(C∗L−1g B), (3.15)
where, B and C are any combination of f columns and rows of L−1g , respectively. If the
attacker chooses columns corresponding to B (instead of B∗), then the elements of C∗L−1g B
increase (compared to C∗L−1g B
∗) which in turn results in increasing σmax(C
∗L−1g B) (based




∗). In the case where n > 2f , the unilateral deviation of
the detector’s decision may not change the elements of CL−1g B
∗ which results in more than
one NE with the same game value. 
The following theorem represents the existence of an equilibrium point in a weighted
directed path graph with f > 1 attacked nodes and f > 1 deployed sensors.
Theorem 3.12. Let Gd be a weighted directed path graph with v` as the leader node in
one end of the path. Then for any f > 1, the attacker-detector game (3.7) admits an NE
happening when the detector chooses f farthest nodes from the leader. 
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 (3.16)
Based on the lower-triangular structure of (3.16), the game admits an NE when the
detector chooses the last f rows of L−1g . Moreover, the attacker’s decision is highly sen-
sitive to the weight assignments. Particularly, based on the values of wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the
attacker has to solve a minimization problem to achieve the least value for the game value
corresponding to his strategy. Different scenarios for this decision making will be explained
in Sec. 3.7. 
Remark 3.13 (Computational cost of the attacker). In a general weighted directed platoon
where there are more than one attacked nodes, the attacker’s decision is highly sensitive to
weight assignments since the attacker has to solve a computationally complex optimization
problem. Particularly, he has to calculate the game value for every combination of selecting
f columns out of n columns of the Laplacian matrix. Mathematically, the cost of this






selections. Depending on the values of f and n, this computation can be of high
burden. 
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3.5 Effects of Adding Extra Communication Links to
a Platoon
In real vehicle platoons, it might be the case that additional communication links either
undirected or directed are added between the vehicles. This will clearly affect the existing
communication environment between the vehicles and the security level of the new platoon.
Hence, in this section, we discuss the impact of adding extra links to a path graph on the
security level of the resulting graph in both undirected and directed cases.
3.5.1 Undirected Case
We consider the general scenario in which an extra edge with weight wi (modeling the
added communication link) is added from node j to node i. In the undirected case, this
extension can be generally formulated as follows
L̃g = Lg + wieije
T
ij, (3.17)
where, L̃g is the perturbed Laplacian matrix corresponding to the new graph, eij = ei−ej,
and ei is a vector with 1 in the i
th position and 0 elsewhere. The following result presents
the effect of adding an extra communication link between two nodes of vehicle platoon on
its security level. The proof of the following theorem is presented in the Appendix.
Theorem 3.14. Let Gu denote a weighted undirected path graph. Then, adding an extra
edge to Gu will decrease the game value. 
Theorem 3.14 indicates that adding new communication links to a platoon equipped by
bidirectional communication links between the vehicles lessens the detectability (visibility)
of the attack. In fact, the attack signal finds more ways to be distributed through the
new links which in turn reduces its power (energy). Consequently, the attack becomes less
visible and more difficult to be detected, creating a less secure platoon.
3.5.2 Directed Case
In the directed case, this extension can be generally formulated as follows




Theorem 3.15. Let Gd denote a weighted directed path graph. Then, adding an extra edge
to Gd which makes a cycle will increase the game value and adding an extra edge to Gd
which does not make a cycle will decrease the game value. 
Proof: The proof will be given in the Appendix. 
Remark 3.16. The results of this section make real sense from a practical point of view.
Particularly, in a platoon equipped by unidirectional communication links (the directed
case), when the extra link is added between two vehicles creating a cycle, this data flow cycle
is created in which the attack signal is circulated and becomes more visible (detectable).
It is worth noting that as this is a directed flow path, there is no power loss for the
attacker while it is circulating. Hence, the game value, i.e., the detectability of the attacker
increases. In the case where no cycle is made, there is no data flow path created for the
attack to be propagated. This physically dampens the attack effect. Thus, the attacker
becomes less visible in the new platoon, and naturally, the game value is decreased. The
same reasoning holds for the undirected case. 
3.6 Security Level of a Platoon with Bidirectional ver-
sus Unidirectional Communication Links
In this section we briefly study the security level of a platoon equipped by either a bidi-
rectional or unidirectional communication links. The following proposition establishes the
result.
Proposition 3.17. Let Gu and Gd denote a weighted undirected and directed vehicle pla-
toon, respectively. The game value corresponding to the attacker-detector game of the
undirected platoon is larger than the directed one, hence, is more secure. 
Proof: Let us first consider the f = 1 case. Based on the general structure of L−1g for
the undirected and directed cases given in (3.14) and (3.16), respectively, one can easily
see that each element of (3.16) is not larger than the corresponding element of (3.14).
This is basically due to the way that these matrices are formed based on Lemma 3.5
and Lemma 3.6. Now let us consider the f > 1 case. With the same argument, we can











for any attacker and detector
decisions. This together with Lemma 3.4 complete the proof. 
This result verifies that when a platoon is equipped by bidirectional communication
links among the vehicles (the undirected case), each vehicle can send and receive more
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data from its both follower and preceding vehicles. This clearly causes a more secure
platoon. In the directed case, i.e., the communication links are of the unidirectional type,
each vehicle is only able to receive data from its preceding vehicle, hence, the detectability
of the attacker might not be maximized compared to the undirected case. Hence, the
security level of the latter platoon is lower than the first one.
Fig. 3.2 shows the entire procedure to determine the optimal strategy for the detector.
3.7 Simulation and Experimental Results
3.7.1 Simulation Results
Here, the application of the aforementioned results in a vehicle platoon subject to bias
injection attacks in two different cases namely, undirected and directed platoons is investi-
gated. In the considered platoon, we place the leader at one end of the path and keep the
same labeling policy for the vehicles as before.
f = 1 Case
In this case, we consider a weighted platoon formation in which the attacker attacks one
vehicle and the detector places one sensor on a specified vehicle. This sensor placement
has to be optimized based on NE of the attacker-detector game. We consider a platoon
with 5 vehicles. The weights have been chosen as, w1 = 2, w2 = 2.5, w3 = 1.5, w4 = 3,
and w5 = 2.75. Fig. 3.3 shows the game values for both the undirected and directed cases
where f = 1. For the undirected case (Fig. 3.3a), based on Theorem 3.8, the game has
non-unique NEs happening in the leader’s neighbor vehicle regardless of the detector’s
action. For the directed case (Fig. 3.3b), based on Theorem 3.10, the game has a unique
NE in the vehicle with maximum incoming weight, which is w4. From Fig. 3.3, one can
easily see that in both undirected and directed cases, if the attacker chooses a vehicle other
than the shown NE, the game value increases. Besides, if the detector chooses a vehicle
other than the shown NE(s), the game value decreases. Hence, neither the attacker nor







Safe and Secure 
Platooning
Figure 3.2: Proposed procedure to obtain the optimal strategy for the detector
f > 1 Case
In this case, we consider a similar platoon with 5 vehicles as in the previous case, and
f = 2. The weights w1 through w5 are the same as before. In this case, the attacker
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(a) Game values for a weighted undirected platoon with f = 1
(b) Game values for a weighted directed platoon with f = 1
Figure 3.3: Game values and NE for weighted undirected and directed platoons for f = 1
attacks a pair of vehicles (j1, j2) and the detector places its sensors on a pair of vehicles
(i1, i2). Fig. 3.4 shows the game values for the undirected case where f = 2. According
to Theorem 3.11, the game admits at least one NE where the attacker attacks 2 closest
vehicles to the leader, and the detector chooses the 2 farthest vehicles from the leader. In
this case, since n > 2f , the game has non-unique NEs. These NEs occur when the attacker
attacks 2 closest vehicles to the leader while the detector can choose any pair of vehicles
such that they do not include the leader’s neighbor vehicle. Fig. 3.4 shows one specific
NE where the attacker attacks the pair (1, 2) (two closest vehicles to the leader) and the
detector chooses the two farthest vehicles from the leader, which is the pair (4, 5). It is
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easily seen that neither the attacker nor the detector are willing to change their actions.
In the directed scenario, based on Theorem 3.12, there exists an NE which happens
when the detector places two sensors in the farthest vehicles from the leader. Fig. 3.5
shows the game values for this scenario in which the game admits an NE where both the
attacker and the detector choose the 2 farthest vehicles from the leader.
For the directed case, we present the following example showing that the attacker’s
decision is highly sensitive to weight assignments.
Example 3.18. Consider the weighted directed platoon shown in Fig. 3.1b with n = 5
vehicles, f = 2, and the following weights, w1 = 2000, w2 = 0.1, w3 = 0.05, w4 = 0.1, and
w5 = 0.01. Based on Theorem 3.12, there exists an NE where the detector chooses the
2 farthest vehicles from the leader. Fig. 3.6 shows the game value for this example. In
this specific platoon, one can easily see that the game admits an NE which happens when
the attacker attacks the 2 closest vehicles to the leader. Based on the lower-triangular
structure of the Laplacian matrix, although there exists a zero element in the fifth column
of L−1g , the attacker is willing to choose the first two columns (not choosing the fifth one
at all) to achieve a lower game value. This example clearly verifies the high dependency of











Figure 3.5: Game values and NE for a weighted directed platoon with 5 vehicles and f = 2
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Figure 3.6: Game values for the specific weighted directed platoon in Example 3.18
3.7.2 Experimental Results
We have conducted experimental tests on a vehicle platoon setup operated by Robotic
Operating System (ROS).
Experimental Setup Configuration
The setup is consisted of 3 vehicles driving on a treadmill (see Fig. 3.7). The vehicles’ po-
sitions are captured by a central infrared camera detecting the specific Apriltags mounted
on the vehicles. Here we consider a virtual leader specifying a desired speed profile, gen-
erated by the host PC, with 3 followers that have to follow this common profile. Each
of the vehicles is equipped by a cascaded PID controller which commands the vehicle to
follow the leader’s speed profile and keep the desired safe distance with its preceding vehi-
cle. The control signals are commanded based on the received data from the central ROS
run on the host PC. In this setup, the data transfer between the vehicles is of directed
predecessor-follower type, i.e., each vehicle can receive data from its predecessor. The data
is exchanged between the host PC running the ROS and the vehicles through an IEEE
802.15.4-based 2.4GHz ZigBee wireless network protocol (see Fig. 3.8). The position, linear
and angular velocity, steering and the throttle of the vehicles are measured in real-time via
the ROS. Two different attack scenarios, namely an acceleration-brake attack and a brake-
acceleration attack will be generated, and the results confirming our theoretical analyses
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Figure 3.7: Vehicle platoon experimental setup
will be demonstrated. It is noteworthy that our experimental results are in line with the
string stability notion in vehicle platoons as well [160].
Attack Scenario I (Acceleration–Brake Attack)
In this experiment, we attack the first follower (vehicle v1) by an acceleration followed
by a brake (see Fig. 3.9). Hence, at the beginning, this vehicle accelerates forward and
gets far from its desired position and then gets back to its original position. Subsequently,
the other two followers have to accelerate first and then brake to keep the desired inter-
vehicular distance among the platoon. Fig. 3.10 demonstrates the position error and the
2-norm of error signals for the followers. From Fig. 3.10a, it is obviously seen that the
attack effect has been propagated through the upstream of the platoon with a time delay.
Fig. 3.10b shows that the norm of the error signal of the last follower will eventually get the
highest value in a finite time. As the norm of the attack signal is a fixed value, based on
Proposition 3.1, the game value (detectability of the attacker) will get the highest value if
the last vehicle in the platoon is monitored. Hence, the detector has to place his monitoring
sensor on the last follower to increase the security level of the system. This clearly confirms
our result for the detector strategy presented in Theorem 3.10.
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Figure 3.8: XBee network connection
Attack Scenario II (Brake–Acceleration Attack)
In this scenario, we attack the second follower (vehicle v2) by forcing it to have a brake
followed by an acceleration (see Fig. 3.11). In a real platoon, this kind of attack could be
of high significance as it can result in severe braking of the other followers resulting in a
huge degradation of the driving comfort and safety. Fig. 3.12 shows the position error and
the 2-norm of the error signals for the vehicles. As it can be seen from Fig. 3.12a, due to
the unidirectional data transfer in the platoon, the attack occurred on v2 does not affect
v1. Again the effect of the attack on v2 propagates to v3 with a short time delay. From
Fig. 3.12b, similar to the first scenario, the detectability of the attacker is maximized if the
detector places its sensor on the last follower which again verifies our previous theoretical
results.
Figure 3.9: Velocity of the attacked car in scenario I
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(a) Position error of the vehicles in scenario I
(b) Norm of the measurement signals in scenario I
Figure 3.10: Position error and norm of the measurement signals of the follower vehicles
in scenario I
Remark 3.19. We can see from Fig. 3.9 and 3.11 that the attacks occurred in about 100 and
80 seconds in scenario I and II, respectively. Having been approximated the acceleration
followed by a brake in scenario I (and the brake followed by an acceleration in scenario II)
with a sinusoidal signal, they reflect approximately 0.01 – 0.02 Hz attacks. Hence, they
can be reasonably captured as the low-frequency attacks. 
Remark 3.20. It is worth mentioning that according to our analytical results (Theo-
rem 3.10), in a weighted directed platoon, the optimal strategy for the detector is to
choose the farthest vehicle from the leader to place the monitoring sensor. Since in our
experimental results the quality of the communication links among the vehicles are the
same (the weights are all equal), the game admits more than one NE with the same game
pay-off regardless of the attacker’s action. This was the situation in the scenario I and II
where different vehicles of the platoon were attacked. 
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Figure 3.11: Velocity of the attacked car in scenario II
(a) Position error of the vehicles in scenario II
(b) Norm of the measurement signals in scenario II
Figure 3.12: Position error and norm of the measurement signals of the follower vehicles
in scenario II
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Remark 3.21. There are some limitations regarding the experimental setup used in this
work. To point out some of the most important limitations, we notice that the wireless
communication among the scaled cars is fast enough and transfers data with relatively low
latency, while in the real scenario, there could be significant time delay in data transfer.
Besides, they do not bear large inertia, and the friction force among the wheels and the
treadmill is negligible. Therefore, it is reasonable to capture their dynamics via a linear
model. These limitations have to be taken into account while implementing the method
on real vehicles. 
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have focused on security and robustness analysis of vehicle platoons
based on a graph-theoretic approach. The vehicles have been assumed to be able to com-
municate data, such as inter-vehicular distance and speed among each other via wireless
communication environments. Both the unidirectional and bidirectional data transfer have
been studied. Moreover, the quality of communication links between the vehicles has been
considered using edge weights of the underlying path graph topology. The platoon is as-
sumed to be under cyber attacks, and a detector is supposed to choose a strategy to place
his monitoring sensors on specific vehicles aiming at increasing the detectability of the
attacker. An attacker-detector game has been defined based on which the existence of any
possible NE points have been studied. Based on our results, the detector can decide about
his sensor placement strategy to increase the security level of the system. Also, robustness
analysis of a platoon against adding extra communication links between the vehicles has
performed. Furthermore, our study verifies the fact that using a bidirectional communica-
tion environment forms a more secure platoon compared to the unidirectional counterpart.
Our simulation and experimental results verified the effectiveness of our theoretical anal-
yses. An open avenue for the current research is to extend the underlying graph topology
such that it can handle dynamic platoon formations resulted from different vehicle ma-
neuvers such as cut-in/cut-out actions, hence, studying the impacts of those movements
on the security of vehicle platooning. Besides, the extension of this work to the dynamic
game (with changing network topology) along with generalizing our method for possibly
different vehicle dynamics in the platoon referred to as the “heterogeneous” case are left




Placement in Vehicle Platooning
In this chapter, we deal with the security challenges of vehicle platoons equipped by dis-
tributed consensus controllers under the risk of cyber attacks. In particular, we mainly
focus on the h–nearest neighbor platoons benefiting from either unidirectional or bidi-
rectional data communications. We let the attacker be able to inject acceleration attack
signals to the longitudinal dynamics of one (or more) of the vehicles present in the platoon
and try to infer the best defense strategy to mitigate the attack effects. We propose a
general approach to find an optimal actuator placement strategy according to the Stackel-
berg game between the attacker and the defender. The game payoff is the energy needed
by the attacker to steer the consensus follower-leader dynamics of the system towards his
desired direction. The attacker tries to minimize this energy while the defender attempts
to maximize it. Thus, based on the defined game and its optimal equilibrium point, the
defender(s) selects optimal actuator placement action to face the attacker(s). Both cases
of single attacker–single defender and multiple attackers–multiple defenders cases are in-
vestigated. Furthermore, we study the effects of different information flow topologies,
namely the unidirectional and bidirectional data transfer structures. Besides, the impacts
of increasing the connectivity among the nodes on the security level of the platoon are
presented. Simulation results for h–nearest neighbor platoon formations along with exper-
imental results using the scaled cars governed by Robotic Operating System (ROS) verify
the effectiveness of the method. Explicitly, the contributions of current chapter are as
follows,
• Considering the longitudinal dynamics of a vehicle, we formulate the attacker-defender
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game as a Stackelberg game problem (4.15) with the attacker(s) and the defender(s)
as the game players. Both of the single attacker–single defender and multi attackers–
multi defenders scenarios will be investigated. Furthermore, we study the impact
of different information flow topologies, namely the unidirectional and bidirectional
data transfer structures on the security level of the system.
• Two energy-related game pay-offs are introduced, namely the trace and the largest
eigenvalue of the controllability Gramian matrix. The former has been introduced
in complex dynamics networks literature [161, 162] and the latter is introduced in
this work. Their interpretation together with their usefulness for our problem is
described.
• A general algorithm to solve the Stackelberg game problem is given, whereby the
optimal solution of the game determines the optimal actuator placement strategy
for the defender. The proposed approach can be applied to platoon formations with
arbitrary information flow topologies.
• Based on the values of the game-payoffs, the effect of increasing the connectivity
among the vehicles of the platoon on its security level is demonstrated. This has
a significant role from the defender’s perspective who tries to mitigate the attack
effects as much as possible.
It is notable that in the previous chapter we proposed Nash game solutions for sensor
placement problem in vehicle platooning to detect attack effects and increase the security
level of the system. The current chapter is basically different in terms of the inherent
problem, i.e., optimal actuator placement to defend and mitigate the attack effects and
also the game formulation, which is the Stackleberg game. In addition, in this work the
platoon model has been generalized to a higher order model to capture more realistic
platoon dynamics.
The results of this chapter have been published in [163].
4.1 Organization of the Chapter
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sec. 4.2 defines the problem state-
ment including the longitudinal vehicle dynamics, objective of the platoon control, con-
sidered spacing policy, and the employed distributed controller. The attack model is also
given in this section. Sec. 4.3 details the defined attacker-defender game along with the
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algorithm to solve for the equilibrium point of the game. Simulation results on h–nearest
neighbor platoons are demonstrated in Sec. 4.4 showing the effectiveness of the method.
Sec. 4.5 is devoted to the experimental results. The proposed method is implemented on
a platform which creates a real platoon composed of the scaled cars governed by the ROS.
Finally, conclusions and open avenues to continue this work are presented in Sec. 4.6.
4.2 Problem Statement
4.2.1 System Model
We consider a platoon consisting of n follower vehicles each of which modeled with the











, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
τ Ṫi(t) + Ti(t) = Ti,des(t),
(4.1)
where pi(t) and vi(t) are the position and velocity of vehicle i, respectively. M denotes
the vehicle mass, CA is the coefficient of aerodynamic drag, fr is the coefficient of rolling
resistance, g is the gravity constant, Ti(t) is the actual driving/braking torque applied to
the drivetrain, Ti,des(t) denotes the desired driving/braking torque, Rw is the tire radius, τ
is the inertial lag of vehicle powertrain, and ηT is the mechanical efficiency of the driveline.
It is assumed that the leader tracks a constant speed reference trajectory, i.e., a0(t) = 0,
p0 = v0t [164], where p0(t), v0(t), and a0(t) denote the position, velocity, and acceleration
of the leader, respectively. The position output with relative degree three along with the
following feedback linearization technique, which is widely used in literature [62,164–166],




(CAvi(2τ v̇i + vi) +Mgfr +Mui)Rw, (4.2)















































(2CAτviv̇i − CAv2i −Mgfr).
(4.4)
Substituting (4.2) into (4.4) leads to
τ ȧi +ai =
1
M
(CAvi(2τ v̇i + vi) +Mgfr +Mui)−
1
M
(2CAτviv̇i−CAv2i −Mgfr) = ui. (4.5)
For the purpose of platoon control, the following 3rd-order state space model is yielded













where ai(t) = v̇i(t) is the actual acceleration of the i
th vehicle.
In this work, we consider a vehicle platoon wherein vehicles are connected through
an h–nearest neighbor information flow topology (see Fig. 4.1). This topology has been
widely utilized in automotive research community. In a directed h–nearest neighbor data
transfer structure, each vehicle has a look-ahead data transfer communicating with its
h predecessors (Fig. 4.1a). In an undirected h–nearest neighbor data transfer structure,
each vehicle looks ahead and back and exchanges vehicular data with its h followers and
predecessors (Fig. 4.1b).
4.2.2 Control Objectives
The platoon control objective is for the followers to track the reference speed profile gen-
erated by the leader while maintaining a constant distance between any two consecutive
vehicles, i.e.  limt→∞ ‖vi(t)− v0(t)‖ = 0,lim
t→∞
‖pi−1(t)− pi(t)−∆i−1,i‖ = 0,
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (4.7)
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(a) Unidirectional information flow
(b) Bidirectional information flow
Figure 4.1: 2-nearest neighbor platoons with different information flow topologies with
sample attackers and actuators
where ∆i−1,i is the desired constant space between consecutive vehicles i− 1 and i.
The desired rigid vehicle formation will be formed by the specific constant distance
∆ij between vehicles i and j, which should satisfy ∆ij = ∆ik + ∆kj for vehicles i, j, and
k. Considering the fact that each vehicle i has access to its own position, the positions,
velocities and accelerations of its neighbors, and the desired inter-vehicular distances ∆ij,
we benefit from the following consensus control law, which is a distributed CACC, and is




kp (pj(t)− pi(t) +∆ij) + kv (vj(t)− vi(t)) + ka (aj(t)− ai(t)) , (4.8)
By collecting the states as xi(t) = [pi(t), vi(t), ai(t)]
T, and defining the tracking error
vector for the ith vehicle, x̃i(t) = [p̃i(t), ṽi(t), ãi(t)]
T = xi(t)−x0(t)−b̃i with b̃i = [∆i0, 0, 0]T,
we get the following error dynamics model
˙̃x(t) =
 0n In 0n0n 0n In
−kp
τ
Lg −kvτ Lg −
ka
τ





where x̃ = [P̃ ˙̃P ¨̃P]T = [p̃1, p̃2, . . . , p̃n, ˙̃p1, ˙̃p2, . . . , ˙̃pn, ¨̃p1, ¨̃p2, . . . , ¨̃pn]
T. Lg is the grounded
Laplacian matrix associated with the underlying graph topology of the platoon which is
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the reduced Laplacian matrix by removing the row and the column corresponding to the
leader node. Matrix Ac in (4.9) can also be rewritten as follows






0 1 00 0 1






, K = [kp kv ka]T, and ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
4.2.3 Attack Model
In this chapter we consider a platoon under the risk of a cyber attack imposed by an
intelligent intruder on one or several vehicles. It is assumed that the attacker injects an
acceleration attack to the longitudinal vehicle dynamics (4.6). The following attacked













where ζi(t) is the injected attack acceleration signal. We assume that the leader is securely
protected and can not be attacked by the intruder, hence, is able to follow the constant
speed reference trajectory.
In order to mitigate the attack effects, one (or more defenders) are assumed to place
self-feedback loops on one (or more) of the vehicle(s). This state-feedback controller uses
the velocity of the defended vehicle(s). This technique has been introduced in literature
aiming at a consensus resilient networked control system [167, 168]. Each defender will
place a self-feedback loop with gain k (see Fig. 4.1). This defense mechanism can be
formulated and integrated with the distributed CACC controller (4.8) as follows which we




kp (p̃j(t)− p̃i(t)) + kv (ṽj(t)− ṽi(t)) + ka (ãj(t)− ãi(t))− kṽi(t), (4.12)
where k is the positive gain of the self-loop feedback from the velocity of the vehicle. This
structure generally describes the formation control of autonomous agents [169].
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Aggregating the defended CACC controller (4.12) with (4.11) in a matrix form yields
the following closed-loop error dynamics
˙̃x(t) =
 0n In 0n0n 0n In
−kp
τ
















where ζ(t) is the attack vector, K = kDy, k is the gain of self-loop feedbacks from the
speed of the vehicles, and Dy is a binary diagonal matrix specifying the node(s) on which
an actuator is placed through a self-feedback loop, i.e., the ith diagonal element of Dy is 1
if the ith vehicle has a self-loop and is 0, otherwise. Matrix B = [e1, e2, . . . , ef ] specifies f
node(s) selected by the attacker. Note that matrix Aa in (4.13) can also be rewritten as
follows









4.3 Attack Effects Mitigation via Optimal Actuator
Placement
In this section, we first formulate the problem as an attacker-defender game and describe
its components in detail. The game-payoff, the players, and the decision variables of each
of the players is explained. Then, some basics of the method, along with the details of the
proposed approach, will be presented.
4.3.1 Attacker-Defender Game
To study the confrontation of the attacker and the defender in a platoon, we formulate
the problem as a game with the attacker and the defender as its players. The conflicting
decision between the players arises by optimizing a game pay-off in opposite directions.
We will focus on two well-known metrics describing the energy needed by the attacker to
deviate the dynamics of the followers towards a direction in the state space. The game
pay-offs will be explained in the next subsection. The decision variable of the attacker is
the B matrix, and the defender’s decision variable is the diagonal matrix K in (4.13). In
fact, the attacker chooses the B matrix to determine the vehicle(s) to attack attempting
to minimize the energy needed to steer the consensus dynamics in the state space. On the
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other hand, the defender makes a decision about the K matrix to equip certain vehicle(s)
with the self-loops to defend making the energy required by the attacker as large as possible.
The attacker-defender game is cast into a Stackelberg game formulation with the defender
acting as the game leader. This formulation leads to study the optimal actuator placement
for the defender based on the optimal equilibrium strategy of the defined game. More
rigorously, the equilibrium point of the Stackelberg game determines the optimal decision
for the defender by which he determines which vehicle(s) to place the actuator(s) on.
Through this placement, the attack energy needed by the attacker to steer the system
into his desired direction will be maximized; hence, the attack effects will be mitigated.
Throughout the chapter, it is assumed that the defender has as many actuators available
as the number of attackers. The results can be simply generalized to more general cases.
We formally introduce the following game
Attacker–Defender Game
The attacker injects the attack signal ζi(t) to f vehicles to minimize his required
energy (defined by one of its physical interpretations) to steer the consensus dynamics
of the system towards his desired direction in the state space, while the defender
places his actuators on f vehicles to maximize the energy needed by the attacker.
Hence, this zero-sum game is represented by either of the two following game pay-offs
J(B,K) = λmax (Wc(B,K)) , (4.15a)
J(B,K) = tr (Wc(B,K)) , (4.15b)
where the attacker’s decision is matrix B to maximize J(B,K) and the defender’s
decision determines matrix K to minimize J(B,K) since the game pay-offs are in-
versely related to the average amount of energy.
Remark 4.1. It is common in the literature that the defender knows an upper bound of the
attacked nodes [157]. Here, we assume that f is an upper bound of the attacked nodes,
and hence, the defender acts based on this worst-case scenario. 
The game pay-offs used in (4.15) are defined in the following subsection.
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4.3.2 Game Pay-off Definition and Interpretation for the Actu-
ator Placement Problem
There have been various metrics introduced in literature with different physical interpreta-
tions related to system controllability for complex dynamical networks [161, 162]. Having
performed an attack on a real system, the attacker usually needs to take an energy limit
action. Hence, controllability metrics dealing with the amount of input energy required
to impose the attack are of our interest. Thus, we focus on two of these energy-related
metrics which are widely used to quantify the controllability level of a network, namely the
largest eigenvalue of the controllabilty Gramian matrix, and its trace. It is notable that,
due to the special control input of our system, which is the attack signal, we utilize the
largest eigenvalue of the controllability Gramian matrix instead of the smallest one, which
is proposed in classical control literature [161, 162]. This will be explained in more detail
subsequently.
Largest Eigenvalue of the Controllability Gramian Matrix (λmax(Wc))
The maximum eigenvalue of Wc is a worst-case metric inversely related to the amount of
energy required to move the system in a direction in the state space that is the easiest to
control. The eigenvector corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of Wc is the direction
in the state space that is the easiest to move the system. We intend to minimize λmax(Wc)
to maximize the control effort needed by the attacker so that he needs much energy to
move the system in the easiest direction he has in hand.
Remark 4.2. Since the control input of our system is the attack signal (undesired input), we
benefit from the largest eigenvalue of Wc. As this eigenvalue and its associated eigenvector
pertain to the easiest direction in the state space to which the attacker can deviate the
system, we target minimizing this quantity in order to make the effort needed by the
attacker as large as possible. In other words, our goal is to make the system as less
controllable as possible for the easiest direction the attacker has in hand. Note that in
typical systems, the control input is the desired signal which imposes using the smallest
eigenvalue of Wc to measure the controllability of the system from the perspective of that
particular input [161,162]. 
Trace of the Controllability Gramian Matrix (tr(Wc))
Trace of the controllability Gramian matrix is inversely related to the average amount of
the energy required by the attacker to move the system around in the state space. We
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intend to minimize tr(Wc) to maximize the control effort needed by the attacker.
Remark 4.3. Minimization of the trace of the controllability Gramian matrix might lead
to an uncontrollable system, such that Wc  0, [161]. In this case, the defender’s action
is to maximize the energy required by the attacker to steer the system in the controllable
subspace, i.e., range(Wc). 
4.3.3 Stackelberg Game Formulation
Before delving into the game formulation, we need to highlight the reason of working with
Stackelberg game. It is due to the nature of our problem (which is a design problem), and
we are interested in designing the optimal actuator placement in an offline fashion. In this
setup, the Stackelberg game suits better. In other words, the design problem is generally
considered as a passive problem which can be reasonably captured by a Stackelberg game
(the reader is referred to [147] specially Table II therein for more details). Besides, in most
of the security problems, owing to the existence of the leader and follower (where one of
the players has the ability to enforce his strategy on the other), it is turned out that the
Stackelberg game is more suitable to formulate the problem.
Considering either of the two aforementioned metrics as our game pay-off, denoted by




where J∗ denotes the optimal value of J . In (4.16), B∗(K) is the attacker’s best response
to the defender’s strategy K. In fact, B∗(K) is the solution to the following optimization
problem
B∗(K) = arg max
B
g(B). (4.17)
Hence, the equilibrium strategy of the Stackelberg game leading to the defender’s op-
timal strategy is given by
K∗ = arg min
K
J∗(K). (4.18)
Algorithm 1 summarizes the procedure for the general case of multi attackers and multi
defenders to find the solution of the Stackelberg game problem. Notably, the Stackelberg
game problem might have non-unique solutions; however, the game-payoff is the same for
all the solutions.
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Algorithm 1 Stackelberg Attacker–Defender Game in Vehicle Platooning
1: Input:
Data transfer structure (Lg), g(·), n, number of attacker(s) (f)





do . i is the defender index





do . j is the attacker index
4: J(B(Ki)) = g(Bj)
5: end for
6: B∗(Ki) = arg maxBj g(Bj)
7: J(Ki) = g(B
∗(Ki))
8: end for
9: J∗(K) = minKi g(B
∗(Ki))
10: K∗ = arg minK J
∗(K)
11: B∗ = arg maxB J(K
∗)
12: Output:
K∗ . Solution of the Stackelberg game problem
(defender’s optimal strategy)
B∗ . Solution of the Stackelberg game problem
(attacker’s optimal strategy)
J(B∗, K∗) . Optimal game pay-off
Referring back to our main objective, i.e., aiming at minimizing the aforementioned
controllability metrics, we first need to calculate the controllability Gramian matrix asso-
ciated with the attacked and defended closed-loop dynamics (4.13). The symmetric positive









which quantifies an energy-related measurement of the controllability level of the system.
Eigenvectors of Wc corresponding to small eigenvalues determine directions in the state
space that are less controllable (require large input energy to reach), and eigenvectors of
Wc corresponding to large eigenvalues reflect directions in the state space that are more
controllable (require small input energy to reach).
In case of an internally stable system, the state transition matrix eAas decays exponen-









This infinite-horizon controllability Gramian matrix can also be computed by solving





a = 0. (4.21)
Equation (4.21) forms a system of linear equations that can be easily solved. Dedicated
algorithms have been proposed to solve for the solution of (4.21) effectively for even large
scale systems [170–172]. In this chapter, we exploit the second method to find the infinite-
horizon Wc in the interest of ease of computation. It is worth keeping in mind that since the
closed-loop matrix Aa incorporates the unknown defender decision variable, K, derivation
of a closed-form of Wc as a function of K is burdensome. Besides, we intend to focus on
the optimal strategy of the defender for different information flow topologies rather than
a general solution for Wc. Hence, we solve (4.21) for Wc numerically based on which we
state the optimal defender strategy to mitigate the attack effects in different scenarios. It
is noteworthy that our game formulation approach can be applied to increase the security
level of platoons with an arbitrary number of followers equipped with different information
flow topologies. Furthermore, other metrics could be exploited while applying our method
for different assessments of the security-related aspects of a platoon.
4.3.4 Stability of the Closed-loop Platoon Dynamics
Generally, as a standard requirement, the stability of the closed-loop platoon dynamics
needs to be ensured while performing the attack mitigation process. This requirement
has to be met to have the desired rigid formation during our defined game. Basically, in
platoon control, there are two different main stability notions defined for the closed-loop
platoon dynamics, namely the internal stability and the string stability. A platoon with
linear time-invariant dynamics is internally stable if and only if the least stable eigenvalue
of the closed-loop system lies on the open left half-hand side of the complex plane [154]. For
a platoon to be string stable, any disturbance introduced in the downstream of the platoon
needs to be dampened while it is propagated along the upstream vehicles [165, 173]. In
this chapter, we focus on the former and leave the latter for future work. Here, to have the
vehicle platoon asymptotically stable prior to any attacks occur, we benefit from a result




Figure 4.2: Closed-loop stability of platoon dynamics with different actuator placement
and different self-loop gains (a): Actuator placed on vehicle 1, (b): Actuator placed on
vehicle 6, (c): Actuators placed on vehicles 2 and 4, (d): Actuators placed on vehicles 5
and 6











where λi is the eigenvalue of the grounded Laplacian matrix. Since we intend to focus
on the optimal defender’s strategy to mitigate the attack effects the most and the tuning
of controller gains is not our concern, we simply choose kp = kv = ka = 1, and k = 2
to satisfy the mentioned conditions and focus on the optimal defender’s strategy for an







Safe and Secure 
Platooning
Figure 4.3: Proposed procedure to obtain the optimal strategy for the defender
sec throughout the following simulations. It is known that the inertial lag is bounded,
i.e., τ ∈ [0, τmax], where τ = 0 corresponds to the ideal case of immediate actuation.
Here, we choose a typical value reported in the literature [68]. Fig. 4.2 shows the stability
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margin of the closed-loop system with the aforementioned values for kp, kv, and ka for
some different actuator placements with different gain values. It is obvious that in all
of the scenarios, including the one we chose for our subsequent simulations (k = 2), the
platoon is asymptotically stable. It turns out that the results hold for any set of controller
gains as long as the platoon remains asymptotically stable.
Fig. 4.3 shows the entire procedure to determine the optimal strategy for the defender.
4.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we present the simulation results stating the optimal actuator placement
of the defender for a platoon with single attacker–single defender and multi attackers–
multi defenders. Defender’s optimal decision is determined based on the solution of the
aforementioned Stackelberg game with the attacker(s) and the defender(s) as its players.
Throughout the simulations, we consider a vehicle platoon consisting of 6 followers con-
nected through the h–nearest neighbor information flow topology shown in Fig. 4.1.
4.4.1 Single Attacker–Single Defender Platoon
Let us consider a vehicle platoon under cyber attack in which the vehicles can communicate
with each other through unidirectional data transfer structure. We assume that each
time one of the followers is attacked and for that particular case, the defender places his
actuator on each of the followers. Fig. 4.4 and 4.6 illustrate the game pay-offs for all
possible combinations of the attacker-defender for two different game pay-offs. One can
easily see that increasing the connectivity among the vehicles cause the game values to be
decreased. This, inherently, is a desired effect from the defender’s perspective. As shown
in these figures, both of the controllability metrics verify this result. Another significant
point which needs to be highlighted is the fact that attacking the leader’s neighbor in the
unidirectional data transfer structure has the worst effect the attacker can impose on the
platoon. In essence, the leader’s neighbor is the vehicle receiving the most original version
(with the least manipulations) of the reference profile generated by the leader. Basically,
when vehicle 1 is attacked, it gets harder for the rest of the followers to receive the correct
form of the reference profile. This is due to the critical role of the leader’s neighbor who
receives the intact reference profile from the leader and broadcasts to all of the followers
regardless of the exploited information flow topology. This is the main reason that, for
example, attacking vehicle 2 in a 2-nearest neighbor (or vehicle 3 in a 3-nearest neighbor)
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(a) 1-nearest neighbor (b) 2-nearest neighbor (c) 3-nearest neighbor
Figure 4.4: Game pay-off for the attacked directed platoon with 6 followers and single
attacker–single defender (game pay-off: λmax(Wc))
(a) 1-nearest neighbor (b) 2-nearest neighbor (c) 3-nearest neighbor
Figure 4.5: Game pay-off for the attacked undirected platoon with 6 followers and single
attacker–single defender (game pay-off: λmax(Wc))
topology will not deteriorate the security level of the platoon as much as that of when
attacking the leader’s neighbor.
In the bidirectional information flow scenario, a similar attacked platoon is considered
except the vehicles are able to send data over a bidirectional data transfer structure.
Fig. 4.5 and 4.7 show the game pay-offs for this scenario. Note that a similar result
regarding the benefit of increasing the connectivity of the platoon clearly holds for the
bidirectional data transfer framework.
4.4.2 Multi Attackers–Multi Defenders Platoon
In this part, we assume the platoon is under cyber attacks imposed by more than one
attacker. To avoid crowded figures in the simulations, we assume f = 2 and perform our
analyses for both the unidirectional and bidirectional data transfer structures.
The same unidirectional and bidirectional platoons are considered except with two
attackers and two defenders. The attackers might attack any pair of the vehicles and
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(a) 1-nearest neighbor (b) 2-nearest neighbor (c) 3-nearest neighbor
Figure 4.6: Game pay-off for the attacked directed platoon with 6 followers and single
attacker–single defender (game pay-off: tr(Wc))
(a) 1-nearest neighbor (b) 2-nearest neighbor (c) 3-nearest neighbor
Figure 4.7: Game pay-off for the attacked undirected platoon with 6 followers and single
attacker–single defender (game pay-off: tr(Wc))
(a) 1-nearest neighbor (b) 2-nearest neighbor (c) 3-nearest neighbor
Figure 4.8: Game pay-off for the attacked directed platoon with 6 followers and two
attackers–two defenders (game pay-off: λmax(Wc))
based on the defender’s strategy, the value of the game pay-off is calculated. Fig. 4.8 and
4.10 show the corresponding game values. As can be seen from these figures, a more densely
connected platoon makes the energy needed by the attacker larger, hence, better from the
defender’s perspective. In this scenario, similar to the single attacker–single defender one,
the attacker can effectively endanger the security of the platoon the most by including the
leader’s neighbor in his attacked vehicles.
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(a) 1-nearest neighbor (b) 2-nearest neighbor (c) 3-nearest neighbor
Figure 4.9: Game pay-off for the attacked undirected platoon with 6 followers and two
attackers–two defenders (game pay-off: λmax(Wc))
(a) 1-nearest neighbor (b) 2-nearest neighbor (c) 3-nearest neighbor
Figure 4.10: Game pay-off for the attacked directed platoon with 6 followers and two
attackers–two defenders (game pay-off: tr(Wc))
(a) 1-nearest neighbor (b) 2-nearest neighbor (c) 3-nearest neighbor
Figure 4.11: Game pay-off for the attacked undirected platoon with 6 followers and two
attackers–two defenders (game pay-off: tr(Wc))
From Fig. 4.9 and 4.11, it is again verified that as the connectivity among the vehi-
cles is increased the attacker needs to exert more energy to perform the attack. Hence,
the mentioned result holds regardless of the communication environment exploited in the
platoon.
Remark 4.4. In all of the presented simulations, one can clearly see that, for any combina-
tion of the attacker(s) and the defender(s), the minimum game pay-off corresponds to the
case where the defender exactly places its actuator(s) on the attacked node(s). Although
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Table 4.1: Solution to the attacker–defender Stackelberg game (defender’s optimal strat-
egy) for the attacked platoons shown in Fig. 4.1 (the numbers represent the vehicle(s) on
which the defender has to place his actuator(s))
f = 1
Directed Undirected
λmax(Wc) tr(Wc) λmax(Wc) tr(Wc)
1-nearest neighbor 3 3 6 6
2-nearest neighbor 1 1 6 6
3-nearest neighbor 1 1 6 6
4-nearest neighbor 1 1 6 6
f = 2
Directed Undirected
λmax(Wc) tr(Wc) λmax(Wc) tr(Wc)
1-nearest neighbor (2, 4) (2, 4) (3, 6) (3, 6)
2-nearest neighbor (1, 4) (1, 4) (5, 6) (5, 6)
3-nearest neighbor (1, 2) (1, 2) (5, 6) (5, 6)
4-nearest neighbor (1, 2) (1, 2) (5, 6) (5, 6)
this precise prediction may be unrealistic, it reflects the ideal decision that could be made
by the defender. Furthermore, as the actuator(s) placement gets farther from the attacked
nodes, the game pay-off increases, i.e., the attacker(s) needs to spend less energy to deviate
the system towards his intended direction. 
Table 4.1 demonstrates the optimal defender’s strategy for different information flow
topologies, different game pay-offs, and different number of players for the considered
platoon. The numbers represent the vehicle(s) on which the defender has to place his
actuator(s). Inspired by this table, in a unidirectional vehicle platoon, it is more benefi-
cial to place the actuator(s) at the downstream of the platoon. On the other hand, in a
bidirectional vehicle platoon, placing the actuator(s) at the upstream of the platoon mit-
igates the attack effects more effectively. Similar results can be generated via the general
method introduced in this chapter for any asymptotically stable platoon equipped with
self-feedback loops.
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Remark 4.5. Various energy-related controllability metrics might result in different control
actions. In essence, in some instances, optimizing the trace of the controllability Gramian
matrix can lead to a poor controllability performance in regard to the worst-case energy
needed to reach a particular state; however, it is known that the selection of optimal nodes
based on this metric benefits a closed-form solution as reported in the literature [161]. In
such cases, if the analyses are performed by employing a numerical perspective without
concerning about a closed-form solution, the largest eigenvalue of the controllability matrix
is more suitable to be used as the game pay-off to ensure an appropriate controllability
index of the system. 
Remark 4.6. It is remarkable that the simulation results show off-line game pay-offs for
different combinations of the players. In fact, they are not the “final optimal” solution of
the Stackelberg game problem which determines the optimal decisions that need to be made
by the players. For instance, as was explained earlier, the game pay-offs demonstrate that
(in a unidirectional topology) the attacker can endanger the security level of the platoon
the most by targeting the leader’s neighbor. This is exactly what the defender (as the
game leader) figures out by solving the Stackelberg game problem to design his strategy.
Hence, the defender eventually takes the optimal action accordingly to face this upcoming
worst-case attack imposed by the intruder. 
4.5 Experimental Results
4.5.1 Basic Setup Architecture
As another verification approach to our results, we perform some experiments on a real
platoon consisting of four scaled cars driving on a treadmill shown in Fig. 4.12. The
positions, linear/angular velocities, steering, commanded throttle, actual throttle, and the
State-of-Charge (SOC) of the batteries of each of the cars are exchanged between the host
PC running the ROS and the vehicles through an IEEE 802.15.4-based 2.4GHz ZigBee
wireless network protocol. Each of the cars is powered up by two identical batteries with
the same initial SOC. The goal positions of the vehicles are commanded by the host PC,
and the actual positions are captured via a central infrared camera detecting the specific
Apriltags mounted on the vehicles. The vehicles find the position of their preceding car
via the central camera and the PC (as the intermediate hardware) modeling the directed
data transfer topology. Due to the limited length of the treadmill and to have the longest
possible platoon, it is formed such that the four follower vehicles track a desired speed
profile generated by the host PC which is considered as a virtual leader.
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Figure 4.12: General schematic of the experimental platoon
4.5.2 Attack Mitigation Experiments
In our experiments, we consider the single attacker–single defender case. Following Algo-
rithm 1 for a 1-nearest neighbor platoon composed of four homogeneous scaled cars with a
directed data transfer structure and considering the largest eigenvalue of the controllability
Gramian matrix as the game pay-off, it turns out that the optimal defender strategy is to
place the self-loop on the second vehicle to mitigate the worst-case attack impact caused by
attacking the third vehicle of the platoon. The controllability Gramian matrix highlighting
the element which reflects the optimal decision made by the players is given by
λmax(Wc) =

1.5678 9.1645 5.2552 3.6413
4.3001 1.5605 5.2552 3.6413
6.0162 4.0937 1.5561 3.6413
10.0278 5.6221 3.8836 1.5504
 (4.23)
Four separate experiments were conducted, each of which handled an acceleration attack
on one of the individual cars along with implementing the defense mechanism on the second
vehicle. In other words, in experiment i, the vehicle i is attacked, and the second vehicle
defends. To reflect the amount of energy needed by the attacker to disrupt the desired
rigid formation of the platoon, we consider the total dropped level of SOC of batteries of
the attacked car.
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Each experiment lasts for 10 minutes, wherein the first 2 minutes, we let the platoon
simply run and reach its steady formation without any occurrence of attack or defense
action. Having got a clear insight into the amount of dropped SOC values during our tests,
we assume the attacker is able to impose his attacks with a periodic timing manner. This
inherently models a severe attack scenario. It is worth keeping in mind that an intelligent
attacker might not perform such a repetitive action in order not to get detected; however,
in this study, we focus on the energy-related criterion of an attack rather than the attack
detection. Hence, it is more appropriate for us to model such an intense attacker to have
a clear view of the amount of energy he may need. The first attack occurs at t = 2 min.,
by injecting a sharp spike to the longitudinal position of the attacked car. The very first
attack has a magnitude of 0.75 meters while the subsequent ones occur at every 2 seconds
with a magnitude of 0.5 meters. The defense mechanism executed by vehicle 2 also has a
periodic fashion. Particularly, it begins at time t = 2 min., lasting for 0.5 seconds with
3 seconds cooldown period between each defense. The total SOC values of the cars are
sampled every 5 seconds and sent to the host PC via the XBee module. Fig. 4.13 shows
the SOC values of the attacked car in each of the four experiments. As one can easily
see from this figure, before the attack/defense onset, the SOCs decrease with a relatively
low slope. Once the first attack occurs along with the defense of the second vehicle, the
SOCs drop significantly. Thereafter, the SOCs decrease with relatively high slopes over
the time course compared to the beginning of the experiments. As was expected, choosing
the optimal solution of the Stackelberg game problem (in this case, the third vehicle), the
intelligent attacker consumes the least amount of energy. Furthermore, based on the SOC
values of the experiments, it is obvious that the intruder is never inclined to deviate his
decision from this equilibrium point. It is also notable that experiment 2 verifies a trivial
case. Rigorously, placement of both the actuator and the attack on the same node results
in the most energy needed by the intruder (most dropped SOC value). However, this case
is unlikely to happen in the real world. Let us consider the case in which the defender
is the game leader (which is our focus in this work). In this case, the defender places its
actuator on a specific node, followed by the attacker’s decision. As the attacker is assumed
to be aware of the defender’s decision, he never attacks the defended node. On the other
hand, let us consider the case where the attacker is the game leader. In this case, the
intruder imposes his attack on a specific node, followed by the defender’s decision. Thus,
the defender definitely defends the exact same node attacked by the intruder resulting in
maximizing the energy required by the attacker; however, in the real world the attacker’s
decision is not known beforehand.
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Figure 4.13: SOC values of the attacked car in each of the four experiments
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, a game-theoretic approach has been proposed to tackle the security chal-
lenges of vehicle platoons. From the viewpoint of secure platoon control, we studied the
problem of threatening a vehicle platoon by one (or more) attacker(s) who tries to dete-
riorate the platoon control by injection of acceleration attack signal(s) to the longitudinal
dynamics of one (or more) of the vehicles. In essence, we focused on the energy needed
by the attacker, as our game-payoff, to steer the consensus dynamics of the system to-
wards his desired direction in the state space. In this regard, the attacker(s) basically
tries to minimize the amount of energy needed to deviate the system dynamics, while the
defender(s) faces this action by attempting to maximize that energy. This confrontation
between the attacker(s) and defender(s) was formulated as a Stackelberg game problem,
and the algorithm to solve the game was given. Based on the equilibrium point of the
game, the defender(s) selects specific nodes(s) to place his actuator(s) in order to mitigate
the attack effects as far as possible. Two different scenarios, namely single attacker–single
defender and multi attackers–multi defenders were considered. The game formulation, its
solution, and simulation results were presented for h–nearest neighbor platoons with dif-
ferent data transfer structures. The proposed technique can be applied to arbitrary data
transfer structures employed in different platoon formation topologies. Besides, the effects
of increasing the connectivity among the vehicles on the security level of the platoon have
been studied. Some experimental tests were also conducted on a real platoon to demon-
strate the applicability of the method in practice. An open avenue for this research would
be to generalize the work to study a platoon consisting of vehicles with different dynamics
referred to as “heterogeneous” platoons.
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Part II







This chapter and the subsequent one deal with the secure control of vehicle platoons under
the risk of a common cyber attack, namely Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. A malicious
DoS intruder can endanger the security of platoon by jamming the communication network
among the vehicles which is responsible to transmit inter-vehicular data throughout the
platoon. In other words, he may cause a failure in the network by jamming it or injecting
a huge amount of delay, which in essence makes the outdated transferred data useless. In
fact, a DoS attacker uses the disruption resources to violate data integrity or availabil-
ity, hence, causes a blockage or at least suffering delays in data transfer in the network
by making the beacon nodes unnecessarily busy. This can potentially result in huge per-
formance degradation or even hazardous collisions. Researchers have devoted efforts to
address the DoS attack in networked control systems and platoons; however, they mostly
limit the study to linear models along with a linear controller applied to homogeneous
platoons and assume perfect communication links [61, 174–176]. We consider a general
heterogeneous platoon under DoS attack with nonlinear vehicle dynamics in our analyses.
It is shown that our proposed algorithm mitigates the effect of the attack while the de-
sired platoon formation is maintained. Besides, our proposed method can handle different
communication topologies, which are some other missing contributions in the literature.
We propose a secure distributed nonlinear model predictive control algorithm consisting
of i) detection and ii) mitigation phases. The algorithm is capable of handling DoS attack
performed on a platoon equipped by different communication topologies and at the same
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time it guarantees the desired formation control performance. Stability analysis of the
attacked platoon running the given algorithm is also presented. Simulation results on a
sample heterogeneous attacked platoon exploiting two-predecessor follower communication
environment demonstrates the effectiveness of the method.
The results of this chapter have been published in [177].
5.1 Organization of the Chapter
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sec. 5.2 defines the problem state-
ment, including the control objectives and the attack model. Sec. 5.3 details the main
results and describes the proposed algorithm. Stability analysis of the attacked platoon
employing the proposed method is presented in the section. Simulation results on a sample
heterogeneous attacked platoon demonstrating the fruitfulness of the method are given in




We consider a heterogeneous platoon consisting of n follower vehicles each of which modeled
with the following discrete-time nonlinear dynamics model [61]
pi(t+ 1) = pi(t) + vi(t)∆t,















ui∆t, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
(5.1)
where ∆t is the sampling time, pi(t) and vi(t) are the position and velocity of vehicle i,
respectively. Mi denotes the mass, CA,i is the coefficient of aerodynamic drag, fr,i is the co-
efficient of rolling resistance, g is the gravity constant, Ti(t) is the actual driving/braking
torque applied to the drivetrain, Rw,i is the tire radius, τi is the inertial lag of vehicle
powertrain, ηT,i is the mechanical efficiency of the driveline, and ui(t) is the desired driv-
ing/braking torque which represents the control input.
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The states and outputs of each vehicle are represented by xi(t) = [pi(t), vi(t), Ti(t)]
T,
and yi(t) = [pi(t), vi(t)]
T, respectively. Collecting the nonlinear terms of the dynamics
(5.1) creates a more compact form{
xi(t+ 1) = φi (xi(t)) +ψiui(t)
yi(t) = γxi(t).
(5.2)





















Stacking the states, outputs, and the control input signals of all vehicles into vectors
yields the platoon dynamics as follows{
X(t+ 1) = Φ(X(t)) + ΨU(t),
Y (t+ 1) = Θ ·X(t+ 1),
(5.3)
where X(t) = [x1(t)
T, x2(t)
T, . . . , xn(t)
T]T ∈ R3n×1, Y (t) = [y1(t)T, y2(t)T, . . . , yn(t)T]T ∈
R2n×1, U(t) = [u1(t), u2(t), . . . , un(t)]T ∈ Rn×1. Besides, Φ = [φT1 , φT2 , . . . , φTn ]T ∈ R3n×1,
Ψ = diag{ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn} ∈ R3n×n, and Θ = IN ⊗ γ ∈ R2n×3n.
We model the communication links among the vehicles in the platoon by a graph
G = {V , E} where V and E denote the set of nodes (vehicles) and the edges (modeling the
links between the vehicles), respectively [178]. Followed by this definition, the adjacency,
in-degree, and pinning matrices are defined as
A = [aij] =
{
aij = 1, if {j, i} ∈ E
aij = 0, if {j, i} /∈ E
(5.4)
D = diag{deg1, deg2, . . . , degn} (5.5)
P = diag{p1, p2, . . . , pn} (5.6)
where degi = Σ
n
j=1aij, and pi = 1 if the leader vehicle can send data to vehicle i and pi = 0
otherwise. Furthermore, we define the neighbor set of vehicle i as Ni = {j | aij = 1, j =
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Figure 5.1: TPF heterogeneous platoon consisted of n followers
1, 2, . . . , n} which are the vehicles that can send data to vehicle i. Besides, we define the
set Oi = {j | aji = 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , n} which are the vehicles that can receive data from
vehicle i. If vehicle i can also receive data from the leader, then Ii = Ni ∪ {0}, otherwise
Ii = Ni. In this chapter, for convenience, we consider a heterogeneous platoon equipped by
Two-Predecessor Follower (TPF) communication topology as an example shown in Fig. 5.1;
however, it is easy to adapt our algorithm for other communication topologies.
5.2.2 Platoon Control Objectives
The platoon control objective is for the followers to track the reference speed profile gen-
erated by the leader while maintaining a constant distance between any two consecutive
vehicles, i.e.  limt→∞ ‖vi(t)− v0(t)‖ = 0,lim
t→∞
‖pi−1(t)− pi(t)−∆i−1,i‖ = 0,
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (5.7)
where ∆i−1,i = ∆0 is the desired constant space between consecutive vehicles i− 1 and i.
5.2.3 Attack Description
We focus on a widely spread cyber attack, called the DoS attack. Basically, a DoS attacker
jeopardizes the security of the system through jamming the network by flooding it with
fake requests so that the shared network becomes overwhelmed by these demands, hence,
is too busy to process the legitimate requests sent by the authorized users [105, 179].
This inherently causes packet loss or at least suffering delays in data transfers. In our
application, we assume that the DoS attacker is able to block the communication link
among two nonconsecutive neighboring vehicles which results in missing inter-vehicular
data received by the follower vehicle.1 In essence, if the communication link among vehicle
1In the next chapter, we will extend our results to another DoS attack modeling presented in the
literature.
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i and i− 2 is attacked during t ∈ [t0, t1], the vehicle i is only able to receive the valid data
up to t = t0 and has the exact same data until the attack is over, i.e., vehicle i will restart
to receive updated data from vehicle i− 2 at t > t1. In the rest of the chapter, we denote
τa = t1 − t0 as the attack period for notational convenience.
Assumption 5.1. As a standard assumption and from a practical point of view, we assume
that the attacker has a limited amount of energy resources that prevents him from jamming
the network ceaselessly [111,180,181]. 
Remark 5.2. It is remarkable that the DoS attacker never attacks a link among consecutive
vehicles. This is due to fact that in our algorithm the positions and velocities are trans-
mitted which can be reliably measured by on-board sensors mounted on an ego-vehicle
such as GPS and radar. Hence, once a follower detects that those quantities are no longer
updated, it can switch to its redundant sensors to have real time data. 
5.3 Main Results
5.3.1 Secure–DNMPC for Vehicle Platooning
To combat the DoS attacker described in the previous section, we exploit a modified ver-
sion of the Distributed Nonlinear Model Predictive Control (DNMPC) approach proposed
in [61], called Secure–DNMPC which aims at mitigating the effects of the attack while
achieving the desired control objectives. The algorithm is basically composed of two main
phases, namely i) the detection and ii) the mitigation phase. In the first phase, we attempt
to detect if a DoS attack is underway. If an attack is detected such that the communi-
cation link connecting the ego-vehicle with its immediate preceding or following vehicle is
endangered, then the algorithm commands the victim vehicle to ignore the data received
through the V2V link (until the attack is over) and switch to its on-board sensors followed
by the implementation of the DNMPC. Otherwise, if the blocked link corresponds to the
farther neighbors of the ego-vehicle, the victim vehicle makes use of the most recent up-
dated data prior to the attack commence and the mitigation phase starts by performing
Secure–DNMPC. Inherently, in the second phase, each vehicle solves a local optimal con-
trol problem given as follows to generate its own optimal control input signal which then
needs to be exchanged with its neighbors.
Problem 5.3 (Local NMPC). Each vehicle i has to solve a local NMPC problem at each
time instant t to get its own optimal control input and exchange it with its neighbors as
follows
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Local NMPC: Vehicle i = 1, 2, . . . , n, has to solve the following optimization problem

















(∥∥ypi (k|t− τa)− ydes,i(k|t− τa)∥∥Qi
+ ‖upi (k|t− τa)− hi (v
p
i (k|t− τa))‖Ri
+ ‖ypi (k|t− τa)− yai (k|t− τa)‖F i
+Σj∈Ni





xpi (k + 1|t− τa) = φ (x
p
i (k|t− τa)) +ψu
p
i (k|t− τa) (5.8b)
ypi (k|t− τa) = γx
p
i (k|t− τa) (5.8c)
xpi (0|t− τa) = xi(t− τa) (5.8d)
upi (k|t− τa) ∈ Ui (5.8e)





ya−j(Np|t− τa) + ∆̃i,j
)
(5.8f)
T pi (Np|t− τa) = hi (v
p
i (Np|t− τa)) (5.8g)
where y−i(t) := [y
>
i1
, . . . ,y>im ]
> (if {i1, . . . , im} := Ni), ydes,i(t) = γxdes,i(t), xdes,i(t) =
[p0(t)− i∆0, v0, hi(v0)]T, hi(v0) = Rw,iηT,i × (CA,iv
2
0 +Migfr,i), Ui = {ui | ui ∈ [ui, ūi]} defines
the feasible bounds on the control input, ∆̃i,j = [∆i,j, 0]
T denotes the desired spacing
between the vehicles i and j, andQi, Ri,F i, andGi are the NMPC tuning weight matrices.
All the aforementioned weighting matrices are assumed to be symmetric and satisfy the
following conditions [61]:
1. Qi  0, which is to penalize the deviation of the output from the desired equilibrium.
It is notable that Qi also determines whether node i is pinned to the leader. If pi = 0,
then node i is unable to know its desired set point, and therefore, Qi = 0 is always
enforced. If pi = 1, then Qi  0 in its penalization functions.
2. Ri  0, which represents the strength to penalize the input error diverged from
equilibrium, meaning that the controller prefers to keep constant speed.
79
3. F i  0, which means that node i tries to maintain its assumed output. Notably, this
assumed output is actually the shifted last-step optimal trajectory of the same node,
and this output is sent to the neighbor nodes in set Oi.
4. Gi  0, which states that node i tries to maintain the output as close to the assumed
trajectories of its neighbors (i.e., j ∈ Ni) as possible.
yai (t) represents the data sent by the vehicle i to the set Oi while y
a
−j denotes the data
received by the vehicle i from its neighbors j ∈ Ni. The penultimate constraint referred
to as the terminal averaging constraint is to enforce the vehicle i to have the same output
as the average of assumed outputs in Ii at the end of the prediction horizon. The last
terminal constraint is to enforce vehicle i to drive with a constant speed at the end of
the prediction horizon. These two constraints are necessary for the stability of the DMPC
algorithm [61]. Superscript a, p, and ∗ are to distinguish between assumed, predicted and
optimal quantities, respectively. The assumed quantities are the ones transmitted by the
vehicles in the platoon.
Fig. 5.2 shows a flowchart illustrating the procedure of the Secure–DNMPC design.
Based on the above problem, the proposed approach is described in detail in Algo-
rithm 2.
5.3.2 Stability Analysis of Secure–DNMPC
In this section we analyze the stability of the Secure–DNMPC algorithm which incorporates
the time delay τa imposed by the DoS attacker. Prior to stability analysis, we first introduce
the following Lemmas.
Lemma 5.4 ([182]). The eigenvalues of Kronecker product of two matrices A ∈ Rn×n and
B ∈ Rm×m are
λiµj, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
where λi and µj are the eigenvalues of A and B, respectively. 
Lemma 5.5 ([61]). For any platoon wherein all the vehicles can receive data (directly/indirectly)
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Figure 5.2: Procedure of the proposed Secure–DNMPC design
Now, we can prove the stability of the Secure–DNMPC algorithm.
Theorem 5.6. If a platoon which is under a DoS attack satisfies the condition in Lemma 5.5,
then the terminal output of the system controlled by the Secure–DNMPC proposed in Al-
gorithm 2 asymptotically converges to the desired state, i.e.
lim
t→∞
∣∣ypi (Np|t− τa)− ydes,i(Np|t− τa)∣∣ = 0. (5.10)

Proof: First of all, we state that a suitable Lyapunov candidate to prove the asymp-
totic stability is the sum of all local cost functions introduced in the local NMPC problem
as suggested by [183]
J∗Σ(t− τa) = Σni=1J∗i
(




Algorithm 2 Secure–DNMPC for Vehicle Platooning under DoS Attack
1: Initialization:
Assumed values for vehicle i are set at time t = 0,
uai (k|0) = hi(vi(0)),yai (k|0) = y
p
i (k|0), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 1
2: while t ≤ tfinal do
3: if pa−j(t) = p
a
−j(t− 1), j ∈ Ni then . Check to see if a DoS is underway
4: if j = i− 1 or j = i+ 1 then . Check to see if the attacked link
5: corresponds to a predecessor or a follower
6: Disable communication link, switch to on-board sensors & Go to: 8
7: else
8: for Each vehicle i do . Implement Secure–DNMPC
9: Solve Problem 5.3 at time t > 0 and yield u∗i (k|t− τa), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 1
10: Compute:
{
x∗i (k + 1|t− τa) = φi(x∗i (k|t− τa)) +ψiu∗i (k|t− τa),
x∗i (0|t− τa) = xi(t− τa), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 1
11: Compute: uai (k|t− τa + 1) =
{
u∗i (k + 1|t− τa), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 2
hi (v
∗
i (Np|t− τa)) , k = Np − 1
12: Compute:
{
xai (k + 1|t− τa + 1) = φi (xai (k|t− τa + 1)) +ψiuai (k|t− τa + 1)
xai (0|t− τa + 1) = x∗i (1|t− τa), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 1
13: Compute: yai (k|t− τa + 1) = γxai (k|t− τa + 1), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 1
14: Send yai (k|t−τa+1) to the vehicles lie in the set Oi, and receive ya−j(k|t−
τa + 1) from neighboring vehicles j ∈ Ni and compute ydes,i(k|t− τa + 1)





Inspired by a similar idea used in [61], we define the tracking error output vector
ỹpi (Np|t− τa) = y
p
i (Np|t− τa)− ydes,i(Np|t− τa) (5.11)
As we assumed that the followers have zero acceleration at the end of the horizon, using
the update control law defined in line 11 of the Algorithm 2 we get
yai (Np|t− τa + 1) = y
p
i (Np|t− τa) + Ey
p
i (Np|t− τa)∆t, (5.12)
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Figure 5.3: TPF heterogeneous platoon imposed by a DoS attacker on the communication






. Combining (5.12) with the terminal averaging constraint together with
considering the defined tracking error vector in (5.11) yields






This can be rewritten in a matrix format




⊗ (I2 + E∆t)Ỹ p(Np|t− τa) (5.14)
where Ỹ p(Np|t − τa) = [ỹpj(Np|t − τa), . . . , ỹ
p
j(Np|t − τa)]T ∈ R2n×1. Based on Lemma 5.5
the eigenvalues of (D+P)−1A lie within the unit circle disk. Besides, one can easily check
that the eigenvalues of I2 +E∆t are all equal to one. Hence, according to Lemma 5.4, the
eigenvalues of ((D + P)−1A) ⊗ (I2 + E∆t) lie within the unit circle disk. This together
with (5.14) completes the proof. 
Remark 5.7. It is notable that in case of emergencies caused by a severe attacker, provided
that the energy constraint is of lower priorities, one can reduce Ri in the cost function
defined in the local NMPC problem to let a more mitigation level against the intruder. In
the extreme case, Ri = 0 lets the controller exert as much control effort as possible to have
a safe and secure platooning. 
5.4 Simulation Results
A heterogeneous platoon consisted of seven different followers is considered where they
can exchange inter-vehicular data among each other through the TPF communication




Figure 5.4: (a) Consecutive spacing, (b) speed, (c) torque, and (d) acceleration of the TPF
heterogeneous DoS attacked platoon
to a DoS attack. Hence, vehicle 3 will not be able to receive the real time data including
the position and velocity of vehicle 1 while the attack is performing (see Fig. 5.3). It is
notable that to tackle a practical scenario, based on Assumption 5.1, the external intruder
is only able to cause communication degradation among the vehicles for a finite time
period. In the simulations the DoS attacker starts jamming the communication link from
vehicle 1 to 3 for τa = 3 seconds in the time interval t ∈ [3, 6]. Seven different vehicles
with practical parameters form the platoon wherein the leader vehicle starts driving at
v0(0) = 20m/s for one second, then it accelerates to reach v0(2) = 22m/s and continues
with this velocity until the end of the simulation. The parameters of the participating
vehicles in the platoon are listed in Table 5.1 which is in accordance with [184]. The
prediction horizon and desired spacing among consecutive vehicles have been chosen as
Np = 20, and ∆0 = 10 meters, respectively. We have extended the code in [185] for our
security analysis. From Fig. 5.4a one can see that despite the blockage of data transfer
link from vehicle 1 to 3, there is no collision occurred in the platoon and the safety has
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Table 5.1: Parameters of the participating vehicles in the static platoon
Vehicle index mi (kg) τi (sec) CA,i (N sec
2 m−2) ri (m)
1 1035.7 0.51 0.99 0.30
2 1849.1 0.75 1.15 0.38
3 1934.0 0.78 1.17 0.39
4 1678.7 0.70 1.12 0.37
5 1757.7 0.73 1.13 0.38
6 1743.1 0.72 1.13 0.37
7 1392.2 0.62 1.06 0.34
been ensured. Besides, Fig. 5.4b demonstrates that Secure–DNMPC algorithm effectively
mitigates the DoS attack and the followers begin to keep tracking the leader’s speed profile
shortly after the attack is over. Convergence of torque and acceleration are also shown in
Fig. 5.4c, and 5.4d. We highlight that the proposed algorithm has been also successfully
tested on different platoon formations such as Two-Predecessor Leader Follower (TPLF),
with different spacing policies such as Constant Time Headway (CTH) policy, and also on
Federal Test Procedure (FTP) drive cycle to emulate urban driving.
Remark 5.8. To select an appropriate value for the prediction horizon, one has to notice
as τa increases, Np needs to be decreased in order to let the vehicles have enough time to
exchange and update their data prior to the attack occurrence. On the other hand, too
small values for Np results in frequent rapid oscillations in the control input which makes
the controller unimplementable in practice. 
5.5 Summary
Having focused on a general static heterogeneous platoon formation under the risk of DoS
attack, we proposed a secure control algorithm which enables the platoon to detect and
mitigate the devastation imposed by the intruder. The algorithm guarantees the desired
platoon performance in terms of its control objectives together with its safety. Besides, the
proposed method tackles the attacker regardless of the employed communication topology
among the vehicles. Simulations performed on a TPF heterogeneous platoon with practical
vehicle dynamics parameters, indicate the efficacy of the proposed technique. Dealing with
other cyber attacks along with achieving additional performance objectives such as driving






Vehicles participating in a realistic platoon most likely bear variant nonlinear dynamics
forming a heterogeneous platoon. It has been widely proved in the literature that nonlinear
control techniques are mandatory to achieve desired formation objectives, such as maintain-
ing a safe gap among consecutive cars while tracking the speed profile of the leader vehicle.
As was mentioned before, despite the benefits arisen from wireless connectivity among
these vehicles, this makes the whole system susceptible to cyber attacks. Recalling from
the previous chapter, one such a prevalent attack, that has broadly drawn the attention
of both cyber-security and control communities, is DoS attack. A DoS intelligent intruder
aims at jamming communication links among cars through overwhelming the beacon node
by fake requests, hence, hinders the network from processing legitimate requests. This can
result in huge performance degradation and even hazardous collisions. In the literature,
lack of a systematic approach adhering to control performance objectives of a dynamic non-
linear heterogeneous platoon while mitigating the DoS attack effects is yet sensible. Thus,
in this chapter, we focus on an attacked dynamic nonlinear heterogeneous platoon in which
arbitrary vehicles might perform cut-in/cut-out maneuvers. Variant nonlinear dynamics
of the participating cars are considered in the model to form a realistic nonlinear heteroge-
neous platoon. Here, we extend the given approach in the previous chapter which ensures
the desired control performance of a dynamic nonlinear heterogeneous platoon equipped
by different communication topologies under the premise of the existence of DoS attack.
The proposed method is capable of providing safe and secure control of dynamic platoons
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in which arbitrary vehicles might perform cut-in and/or cut-out maneuvers. Convergence
time analysis of the system are also investigated. Furthermore, to handle DoS attacks
modeled by an exceeding time delay in inter-vehicular data transmission, we propose the
integration of an Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) design within the controller resulting in
a novel Secure–DNMPC–UKF co-design. This, in essence, estimates the delayed system
states and feeds the predicted values to the Secure–DNMPC, which efficiently mitigates
the attack effects. Simulation results demonstrate the fruitfulness of the proposed method.
Contributions of this chapter are explicitly as follows. Under the premise of existence
of a DoS attacker of either a network blocker or a huge time delay injector, we propose
a Secure Distributed Nonlinear Model Predictive Control (Secure–DNMPC) framework
to detect and mitigate the attack effects while ensuring fulfillment of the platoon control
objectives. The algorithm is flexible to adopt different communication topologies handling
inter-vehicular data transfer among the vehicles. Convergence time and stability analysis
of the algorithm is proved in some cases. Furthermore, in case of a DoS attacker as an
exceeding time delay injector, since the transferred data are still available while the attack
is underway, we propose to make use of the outdated system states and take benefit of them
to implement the control strategy instead of simply ignoring the data and using the most
recent one. This will effectively improve the control performance of the whole system.
In essence, we propose to embed a UKF as the state observer within the design of the
Secure–DNMPC to adapt the algorithm to the delayed data transmission. This results in
a novel Secure–DNMPC–UKF co-design. In addition, this gives the opportunity to either
consider non-ideal noisy sensors or take into account the contaminated sent data due to
the noisy surrounding environment and road conditions.
The results of this chapter have been published in [186,187].
6.1 Organization of the Chapter
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sec. 6.2 presents the system model-
ing, including the platoon model and different types of DoS attack descriptions. Sec. 6.3
details the design of the secure controller together with some stability analysis results.
Adaptation of the algorithm to handle dynamic maneuvers together with convergence
time analysis are given in Sec. 6.4. Sec. 6.5 demonstrates the simulation results on a Two-
Predecessor Follower (TPF) attacked nonlinear dynamic heterogeneous platoon. Finally,




Let us consider a platoon of vehicles, consisting of a Leader Vehicle (LV) and N Follower
Vehicles (FVs) indexed by N := {1, . . . , N}. In this chapter, we consider the longitudi-
nal dynamics and unidirectional communication topologies. Let ∆t be the discrete time
interval and pi(t), vi(t), and Ti(t) denote the position, velocity, and the integrated driv-
ing/breaking torque of the i-th FV at time t, respectively. For the i-th FV, we denote
the vehicle mass, the coefficient of aerodynamic drag, the coefficient of rolling resistance,
the inertial lag of longitudinal dynamics, the tire radius, the mechanical efficiency of the
driveline, and the control input by mi, CA,i, fr,i, τi, ri, ηi, and ui(t) ∈ R, respectively and
g is the gravity constant. The dynamics of the i-th FV can be stated via the following
discrete-time nonlinear model [61]{
xi(t+ 1) = φi(xi(t)) + ui(t)ψi
yi(t) = γ xi(t),
(6.1)
where xi(t) := [pi(t), vi(t), Ti(t)]
> ∈ R3 and y(t) := [pi(t), vi(t)]> ∈ R2 are the states and








 pi(t) + vi(t)∆tvi(t) + ∆tmi (ηiriTi(t)− CA,i v2i (t)−mi g fr,i)
Ti(t)− (1/τi)Ti(t)∆t
 . (6.2)
Stacking the states, outputs, and the control input signals of all vehicles into vectors
yields the platoon dynamics as follows{
X(t+ 1) = Φ(X(t)) + ΨU(t),
Y (t+ 1) = Θ ·X(t+ 1),
(6.3)
where X(t) = [x1(t)
T, x2(t)
T, . . . , xN(t)
T]T ∈ R3N×1, Y (t) = [y1(t)T, y2(t)T, . . . , yN(t)T]T ∈
R2N×1, U(t) = [u1(t), u2(t), . . . , uN(t)]T ∈ RN×1. Besides, Φ = [φT1 , φT2 , . . . , φTN ]T ∈ R3N×1,
Ψ = diag{ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψN} ∈ R3N×N , and Θ = IN ⊗ γ ∈ R2N×3N .
Let A = [aij] ∈ RN×N be the adjacency matrix of the underlying platoon graph topology
where aij = 1 (= 0) means that the j-th FV can (cannot) send information to the i-th
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Figure 6.1: TPF heterogeneous vehicle platoon with a leader and N followers
FV, and D = diag{deg1, deg2, . . . , degn} be the degree matrix, where degi = Σnj=1aij.
Also, let pi = 1 (= 0) mean that the i-th FV is (not) pinned to the LV and gets (does
not get) information from it. Suppose Pi := {0} if pi = 1 and Pi := ∅ if pi = 0. The
pinning matrix is then defined by P = diag{p1, p2, . . . , pn}. We denote Ni := {j|aij =
1, j ∈ N} and Oi := {j|aji = 1, j ∈ N} as the sets of FVs which the i-th FV can
get information from and send information to, respectively. The set Ii := Ni ∪ Pi is the
set of all vehicles sending information to the i-th FV. In this study, for convenience, we
consider a dynamic heterogeneous platoon equipped by Two-Predecessor Follower (TPF)
communication topology shown in Fig. 6.1; however, it is straightforward to adapt our
algorithm to other communication topologies.
Assumption 6.1. The directed graph of the platoon topology contains a spanning tree
rooted at the LV. This assumption is necessary for stability in both homogeneous [188] and
heterogeneous [61] platooning. This ensures that all vehicles get the leader’s information
either directly or indirectly. 
6.2.2 Platoon Control Objectives
The control objectives of the platoon are to track the speed profile generated by the leader
while keeping the safe desired distance between the vehicles. Mathematically, we aim at
limt→∞ |vi(t)−v0(t)| = 0 and limt→∞ |pi−1(t)−pi(t)−d| = 0 where d is the desired constant
distance between every two consecutive vehicles. We also denote the distance between the
i-th and j-th FVs by di.j.
Two types of output are considered here, which are the predicted and assumed outputs.
The former is obtained by the calculated control input from optimization, which is fed to
the system. The latter is obtained by shifting the optimal output of the last-step opti-
mization problem. Let ypi (k|t) and yai (k|t) denote the predicted output and the assumed
output, respectively. We explain the details of how to obtain these two outputs in the
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following sections. The predicted and assumed states are denoted by xpi (k|t) and xai (k|t),
respectively.
6.2.3 Attack Description
Extending the results of the previous chapter, we mainly focus on a widespread cyber-
attack, called the DoS attack modeled by two different approaches used in the literature.
Basically, endangering the security of the system, a DoS attacker jams the network by
flooding it with fake requests such that the shared network gets overwhelmed by these
demands; hence, becomes too busy to process the legitimate requests sent by the authorized
users [105, 179]. This inherently causes packet loss or at least suffering delays in data
transfers. In our application, we study two different DoS attack modeling introduced in
the literature, i.e.,
• The DoS attacker is able to block the communication link among two nonconsecutive
neighboring vehicles, which results in missing inter-vehicular data received by the
follower vehicle. In essence, if the communication link among vehicle i and i − 2 is
attacked during t ∈ [t0, t1], the vehicle i is only able to receive the valid data up to
t = t0 and has the exact same data until the attack is over, i.e., vehicle i will restart
to receive updated data from vehicle i − 2 at t > t1. In the rest of the chapter, we
denote τa = t1 − t0 as the attack period for notational convenience.
• Another prevalent DoS attack type is to view the intruder as who injects a relatively
large delay in the data transmission network. Hence, in this case, during the attack
period τa, the follower vehicles receive the data with the time delay τr. This time
delay is much larger compared to a threshold for a practical DSRC network.1 The





Γ (τ)dτ ≤ PFAR, acceptable, (6.4)
where Γ (τ) is the probability density function of the time delay, and δ is the chosen
threshold (shown in Fig. 6.2) [129]. The threshold δ can also be determined using
Monte-Carlo simulations, False Positives and True Negatives [109].
We will propose countermeasures in subsequent sections to face both of the aforemen-
tioned attack modelings.
1It should be noted that the acceptable time delay heavily depends on the application. Here, we focus
on the automotive control application.
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Figure 6.2: Probability distribution function of the false alarm rate and the threshold
6.3 Secure Controller Design for Dynamic Heteroge-
neous Platooning
6.3.1 Overview
To countermeasure the DoS attacker explained in the previous section, we take advantage
of a modified version of the Distributed Nonlinear Model Predictive Control (DNMPC)
approach proposed in [61], called Secure–DNMPC which aims at mitigating the effects of
the attack while achieving the desired control objectives. The algorithm basically consists
of two main phases, namely i) detection and ii) mitigation phase. In the first phase, we
seek to detect if a DoS attack is running. If an attack is detected and the attacked com-
munication link corresponds to the ego-vehicle with its immediate preceding or following
vehicle, then the algorithm ignores the data received through the V2V link (until the at-
tack is over) and switches to the on-board sensors followed by the implementation of the
DNMPC. Otherwise, if the blocked link corresponds to the farther neighbors of the ego-
vehicle, the victim vehicle makes use of the most recent updated data prior to the attack
commence, and the mitigation phase starts by performing Secure–DNMPC. Inherently, in
the second phase, each vehicle solves a local optimal control problem detailed as follows
to generate its own optimal control input signal, which is used to compute the assumed
states. The assumed states are then exchanged with the neighbors. Moreover, if the in-
truder targets the communication link by injecting a huge amount of time delay in data
transmission, denoted by τr, the algorithm switches to the Secure–DNMPC–UKF mode to
make use of the delayed states as much as possible. Specifically, in this case, the controller
employs the observer to estimate the delayed states and provides the controller with the
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predicted data. The mechanism of the controller in both of the above-mentioned cases are
detailed in the following sections.
Assumption 6.2. As a standard assumption and from a practical point of view, we assume
that the attacker has a limited resource of energy preventing him from jamming the network
ceaselessly [111,180,181]. 
Remark 6.3. It is notable that the DoS attacker never attacks a link between two con-
secutive vehicles. The reason is that in the algorithm, the positions and velocities are
transmitted, which can be reliably measured by on-board sensors mounted on an ego-
vehicle such as GPS and radar. Thus, once a follower detects that those quantities are no
longer updated, it can switch to its redundant sensors to obtain real time data. 
6.3.2 Design of the Secure Controller
Similar to the previous chapter, let us consider a predictive horizon Np for the model
predictive control employed to control the platoon. Suppose the predicted control inputs
over the horizon are Upi (t − τa) := {u
p
i (0|t − τa), . . . , u
p
i (Np − 1|t − τa)} which need to be
calculated by the following optimization problem, which is the local NMPC problem that












subject to xpi (k + 1|t− τa)=φi(x
p
i (k|t− τa))+ u
p
i (k|t− τa)ψi, (6.5b)
ypi (k|t− τa) = γ x
p
i (k|t− τa), (6.5c)
xpi (0|t− τa) = xi(t− τa), (6.5d)
upi (k|t− τa) ∈ Ui, (6.5e)






ya−j(Np|t− τa) + d̃i,j
)
, (6.5f)
T pi (Np|t− τa) = hi(v
p
i (Np|t− τa)), (6.5g)
where y−i(t) := [y
>
i1
, . . . ,y>im ]
> (if {i1, . . . , im} := Ni), Ui = {ui | ui ∈ [ui, ūi]} defines the
feasible bounds on the control input, |Ii| is the cardinality of Ii, d̃i,j := [di.j, 0]>, and τa
is the duration of the attack. The last two terminal constraints are to make the DNMPC
algorithm stable. Detailed description of the above constraints are the same as the previous
chapter and is not repeated here for the sake of brevity.
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‖ypi (k|t− τa)− ydes,i(k|t− τa)‖Qi
+ ‖upi (k|t− τa)− hi(v
p
i )‖Ri + ‖y
p








in which, for a weight matrix A  0, ‖x‖A := x>Ax. In (6.6), 0  Qi,F i,Gi ∈ R2
and 0 ≤ Ri ∈ R are the weight matrices which are the NMPC regularization factors. In
fact, the matrices Qi, Ri, F i, Gi penalize for deviation of the predicted output from the
desired output ydes,i(k|t−τa), deviation of the predicted control input from the equilibrium,
deviation of the predicted output from the assumed output, and deviation of the predicted
output from the neighbors’ assumed trajectories, respectively. For the i-th FV, the desired
state and control signal are xdes,i(t) := [pdes,i(t), vdes,i(t), Tdes,i(t)]
> and udes,i(t) := Tdes,i(t),
respectively, where pdes,i(t) := p0(t)− i d, vdes,i(t) := v0, Tdes,i(t) := hi(v0) where hi(v0) :=
(ri/ηi)(CA,i v
2
0 +mi g fr,i) is the external drag. The desired output is ydes,i(t) := γ xdes,i(t) ∈
R2.
Having injected the DoS attack on the communication network of two nonconsecutive
vehicles, the follower car fails to receive updated data from its neighbor. It should be
noted that what distinguishes the intelligent intruder from an intrinsic network time delay
is that the data received after a huge time delay is no longer useful to generate the correct
control input. To combat this attacker, we propose to integrate an Unscented Kalman
Filter (UKF) within our Secure–DNMPC such that the receiver can estimate the missing
data and feed the predicted values to the NMPC controller. Consequently, the NMPC
controller ignores the delayed states and makes use of the predicted values as long as the
attack is running. We refer to this mode of the controller as the Secure–DNMPC–UKF
mode. The controller is then switched back to Secure–DNMPC once either the attack is
over or the injected time delay falls below the specified threshold.
Embedding the UKF within our design takes us one more step closer to a more realistic
vehicle platoon system. In particular, through our proposed co-design, we can take the
process and sensor noise into account as well, which is of high importance especially for
measurement sensors. From one side, assuming ideal non-noisy sensors, as done in most
of the existing works in the literature, is a contrived assumption. On the other hand,
the signals sent through the environment from one vehicle to another will be most likely
compromised by some noise due to the surrounding environment and road conditions.
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The reason of choosing UKF over Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) is to avoid the prop-
agation of the state distribution approximation error through the system dynamics caused
by the first-order linearization performed in EKF. This is vital in terms of ensuring the
safety of the platoon as the propagated error in the true posterior mean and covariance of
the transformed Gaussian random variable may be large and cause unsafe driving behav-
ior. Remarkably, adopting UKF does not impose anymore computational burden compared
to EKF. The interested reader is referred to [189] for more details on the superiority of
UKF over EKF for nonlinear state estimation. Fig. 6.3 shows a flowchart illustrating the
procedure of the Secure–DNMPC–UKF co-design.
Before delving into the details of the Secure–DNMPC–UKF algorithm, a quick overview
of the basics of Unscented Kalman Filtering are given in the following.
6.3.3 Principles of Unscented Kalman Filtering
Unscented Kalman Filter, as a nonlinear state observer, basically relies on the unscented
transformation to capture the statistical properties of state estimates via nonlinear func-
tions. The observer initially captures the mean and covariance of the state estimates
through a set of so-called sigma points. The algorithm makes use of those sigma points
as the inputs of the process and measurement functions to generate a new set of states.
Subsequently, a set of state estimates and state estimation error covariance are obtained
using the mean and covariance of the previously transformed points.
Let us consider an n-state nonlinear system described by the following nonlinear state
transition and measurement functions compromised by additive zero-mean process noise
w[k] ∼ (0,Q[k]) and measurement noise v[k] ∼ (0,R[k]){
x[k + 1] = f(x[k], us[k]) +w[k]
y[k] = h(x[k], um[k]) + v[k]
(6.7)
The filter takes the following steps to obtain the state estimates and the state estimation
error covariance
1. The filter is initialized with an initial value for state x[0] and state estimation error
covariance matrix P
x̂[0| − 1] = E(x[0]) (6.8)




Is DoS attack 
underway?
Yes
Does the attacked link 
correspond to an immediate 
front or back link?
Yes Disable the communication link, 




Is the DoS 





DoS is of the exceeding 
time delay injector type
No
Run UKF and estimate 
the delayed system states
Feed the predicted values 
to the Secure-DNMPC




Figure 6.3: Procedure of the proposed Secure–DNMPC–UKF co-design
where x̂[k] is the state estimate at time k and x̂[k1|k0] denotes the state estimate at
time k1 using the measurement data up to time k0.
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2. Having used the measurement data y[k] at each time instant k, the filter updates the
state estimate and the state estimation error covariance:
(a) Choose the sigma points x̂(i)[k|k − 1] at time k
x̂(0) = x̂[k|k − 1] (6.10)
x̂(i)[k|k − 1] = x̂[k|k − 1] +∆x(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n (6.11)
∆x(i) = (
√
cP [k|k − 1])i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (6.12)
∆x(n+i) = −(
√
cP [k|k − 1])i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (6.13)
where c = α2(n + κ) is a scaling factor and (
√
cP )i is the i-th column of the√
cP matrix [190].
(b) For each of the sigma points, use the nonlinear measurement function to compute
the predicted measurements
ŷ(i)[k|k − 1] = h(x̂(i)[k|k − 1], um[k]), i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n (6.14)





(i)[k|k − 1] (6.15)







, i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n (6.17)







(i)[k|k − 1]− ŷ[k])(ŷ(i)[k|k − 1]− ŷ[k])> +R[k] (6.18)







, i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n (6.20)
For the details on effects of parameters α, β, and κ the reader is referred to [190].
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(i)[k|k − 1]− x̂[k|k − 1])(ŷ(i)[k|k − 1]− ŷ[k|k − 1])>
(6.21)
Note that x̂(0)[k|k − 1]− x̂[k|k − 1] = 0.





x̂[k|k] = x̂[k|k − 1] +K(y[k]− ŷ[k]) (6.23)
P [k|k] = P [k|k − 1]−KPyK>k (6.24)
where K is the Kalman gain.
3. Now the state and state estimation error covariance can be predicted at time instant
k + 1
(a) Choose the sigma points x̂(i)[k|k] at time instant k.
x̂(0)[k|k] = x̂[k|k] (6.25)
x̂(i)[k|k] = x̂[k|k] +∆x(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n (6.26)
∆x(i) = (
√
cP [k|k])i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (6.27)
∆x(n+i) = −(
√
cP [k|k])i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (6.28)
(6.29)
(b) In order to get the predicted states at time k + 1, combine the predicted states
x̂[k + 1|k] = Σ2ni=0W (i)n x̂
(i)[k + 1|k] (6.30)







, i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n (6.32)
4. To account for the process noise, add Q[k] and compute the covariance of the pre-
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Figure 6.4: Schematic of the proposed Secure–DNMPC–UKF co-design
dicted state
P [k + 1|k] = Σ2ni=0W (i)c (x̂
(i)[k + 1|k]− x̂[k + 1|k])(x̂(i)[k + 1|k]− x̂[k + 1|k])> +Q[k]
(6.33)







, i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n (6.35)
For more details on the observer for the case of non-additive process/measurement
noise, please see [190].
The proposed algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 3, which is the extended version of
the given approach in the previous chapter for static platoons. We further note that yai (t)
represents the data sent by the vehicle i to the set Oi while ya−j denotes the data received by
the vehicle i from its neighbors j ∈ Ni. Superscript a, p, and ∗ are to distinguish between
assumed, predicted, and optimal quantities, respectively. The assumed quantities are the
ones transmitted by the vehicles in the platoon. Fig. 6.4 illustrates the Secure–DNMPC–
UKF co-design in which x̂(k|t) denotes the estimated state at time instant k using the
measured data up to time t.
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Algorithm 3 Secure–DNMPC–UKF for Dynamic Nonlinear Heterogeneous
Vehicle Platooning under DoS Attack
1: Initialization:
Assumed values for vehicle i are set at time t = 0,
uai (k|0) = hi(vi(0)),yai (k|0) = y
p
i (k|0), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 1
2: while t ≤ tfinal do
3: Cut-in/cut-out CHECK . Check to see if cut-in/cut-out occurred
4: Adjust data send-to/receive-from vehicles based on the occurred cut-in/cut-out
5: if pa−j(t) = p
a
−j(t− 1), j ∈ Ni then . Check to see if a DoS is underway
6: if j = i− 1 or j = i+ 1 then . Check to see if the attacked link
7: corresponds to a predecessor or a follower
8: Disable communication link, switch to on-board sensors, τa ← 0, and Go to: 12
9: else
10: if Attacker blocks the communication link then . Check to see if the attacker is of
11: the blockage type
12: for Each vehicle i do . Implement Secure–DNMPC
13: Solve Problem 6.5 at time t > 0 and yield u∗i (k|t− τa), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 1
14: Compute:
{
x∗i (k + 1|t− τa) = φi(x∗i (k|t− τa)) +ψiu∗i (k|t− τa),
x∗i (0|t− τa) = xi(t− τa), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 1
15: Compute: uai (k|t− τa + 1) =
{
u∗i (k + 1|t− τa), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 2
hi (v
∗
i (Np|t− τa)) , k = Np − 1
16: Compute:
{
xai (k + 1|t− τa + 1) = φi (xai (k|t− τa + 1)) +ψiuai (k|t− τa + 1)
xai (0|t− τa + 1) = x∗i (1|t− τa), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 1
17: Compute: yai (k|t− τa + 1) = γxai (k|t− τa + 1), k = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 1
18: Send yai (k|t− τa + 1) to the vehicles lie in the set Oi, and receive ya−j(k|t− τa + 1)
from neighboring vehicles j ∈ Ni and compute ydes,i(k|t− τa + 1)
19: Exert the first element of the optimal control signal ui(t− τa) = u∗i (0|t− τa)
20: end for
21: else if Attacker injects exceeding delay τr > δ then . Check to see if the attacker
22: is of the exceeding time delay injector type
23: Switch to Secure–DNMPC–UKF mode
24: Estimate the delayed states via UKF





Since the stability analysis of the controller is mostly the same as the previous chapter,
we omit that here.
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6.4 Dynamic Platoon Control: Handling Cut-in/Cut-
out Maneuvers
In this section, we consider a dynamic heterogeneous platoon wherein arbitrary vehicle(s)
might perform cut-in/cut-out maneuvers. Here, we demonstrate the ability of the proposed
algorithm to handle dynamic maneuvers while the platoon is subject to the cyber attack.
First, we consider a secure dynamic heterogeneous platoon and prove some results based
on which we extend the results to an insecure platoon. Assume there exist Nci cut-in and
Nco cut-out maneuvers in total while the number of initial FVs in the platoon is N . Let
Nci := {1, . . . , Nci} and Nco := {1, . . . , Nco}. We denote the time of the i-th cut-in and the
j-th cut-out maneuvers by tci,i and tco,j, respectively. The following theorem determines the
time of convergence of a dynamic platoon including possible cut-in and cut-out maneuvers.
Lemma 6.4 ([61, Theorem 2]). If Assumption 6.1 is satisfied, then Problem (6.5) guar-
antees convergence of the output to the desired output in at most N time steps, i.e.,
ypi (Np|t) = ydes,i(Np|t),∀t ≥ N , for a static platoon (without any dynamic maneuvers).

Theorem 6.5. When having cut-in and/or cut-out maneuvers in a secured dynamic pla-
toon, if Assumption 6.1 is satisfied, the Problem (6.5) guarantees convergence of the output
to the desired output in at most
tconv, secure := max
i,j
[
tci,i, tco,j | ∀i ∈ Nci, ∀j ∈ Ncj
]
+N +Nci −Nco, (6.36)
time steps, i.e., ypi (Np|t) = ydes,i(Np|t),∀t ≥ tconv, secure. 
Proof: Let L := D −A be the Laplacian matrix of the underlying platoon graph
topology. When a new cut-in or cut-out occurs, some new chaos is introduced to the
system so we can consider the latest cut-in/cut-out maneuver. Considering the latest cut-
in, one vehicle is added to the number of existing vehicles, let it be N . If the platoon
graph is unidirectional and satisfies Assumption 6.1, the new A ∈ R(N+1)×(N+1) is a lower-
triangular matrix. Moreover, according to [61, Lemma 4], we have D + P > 0, yielding
the eigenvalues of (D + P)−1A to be zero and this matrix to be nilpotent with degree
at most N + 1. Based on [61, Lemma 1] and [61, Theorem 1], ypi (Np|t) converges to the
desired output in at most N + 1 steps. Extending this to Nci cut-in maneuvers requires
N+Nci time steps after the latest cut-in. Similar analysis can be performed for the cut-out
maneuvers, resulting in N − Nco time steps after the latest cut-out because the number
of vehicles has been reduced. In general, having Nci cut-in and Nco cut-out maneuvers
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will need N + Nci −Nco time steps after the latest maneuver which can be formulated as
maxi,j[tci,i, tco,j | ∀i ∈ Nci,∀j ∈ Ncj]. 
Corollary 6.6. Lemma 6.4, for the static platoon, is a special case of Theorem 6.5 which
is for a dynamic platoon. 
Proof: When neither cut-in nor cut-out happen, the time of convergence is tconv, secure =
0 +N + 0 + 0 = N according to Theorem 6.5. 
Remark 6.7 (Special Cases). Four special cases of the dynamic platoon are as follows:
1. One cut-in happens at t = 0 and one cut-out happens at t = N : According to
Theorem 6.5, the platoon converges in t = N +N + 1−1 = 2N . It is correct because
before the cut-out, the platoon contains N + 1 vehicles until time N . When cut-out
happens, the platoon is changed to a platoon with N vehicles which converges in N
time steps according to Lemma 6.4.
2. One cut-out happens at t = 0 and one cut-in happens at t = N : According to
Theorem 6.5, the platoon converges in t = N + N + 1 − 1 = 2N , which is correct
because in t ∈ [0, N ], the platoon includes N − 1 vehicles until time N . When cut-in
happens, the platoon is modified to a platoon with N vehicles which converges in N
time steps according to Lemma 6.4.
3. Both cut-in and cut-out happen at t = 0: According to Theorem 6.5, the platoon
converges in t = 0 + N + 1 − 1 = N , which is correct because the platoon includes
N vehicles which converges in N time steps according to Lemma 6.4.
4. Both cut-in and cut-out happen at t = N : According to Theorem 6.5, the platoon
converges in t = N + N + 1 − 1 = 2N , which is correct because in t ∈ [0, N ],
the platoon includes N vehicles. After the cut-in/cut-out actions the platoon still
includes N vehicles which converges in N time steps according to Lemma 6.4.

Corollary 6.8. When having cut-in and/or cut-out maneuvers in an insecure dynamic
platoon, if Assumption 6.1 is satisfied, the convergence time of the output to the desired
output is upper bounded by tconv, secure + max{τr, τa}, i.e.,2
tconv, insecure ≤ max
i,j
[
tci,i, tco,j | ∀i ∈ Nci,∀j ∈ Ncj
]
+N +Nci −Nco + max{τr, τa}, (6.37)
time steps, i.e., ypi (Np|t− τ) = ydes,i(Np|t− τ), ∀t ≥ tconv, insecure. 
2Although, this upper bound might be conservative in some cases (such as in the scenario studied in
subsection 6.5.2), it provides a safe margin for the convergence time of the controller.
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Figure 6.5: TPF heterogeneous attacked vehicle platoon with a leader and 7 followers
6.5 Simulation Results
A heterogeneous platoon consisted of seven different followers is considered where they
can exchange inter-vehicular data among each other through the TPF communication
topology. It is assumed that the communication link among the vehicle 1 and 3 is subject
to a DoS attack. Hence, vehicle 3 will not be able to receive the real time data including
the position and velocity of vehicle 1 while the attack is performing (see Fig. 6.5). It is
notable that to tackle a practical scenario, based on Assumption 6.2, the external intruder
is only able to cause communication degradation among the vehicles for a finite time
period. In the simulations, the DoS attacker starts jamming the communication link from
vehicle 1 to 3. Seven different vehicles with realistic parameters form the platoon wherein
the leader vehicle starts driving at v0(0) = 20m/s for one second, then it accelerates to
reach v0(2) = 22m/s and continues with this velocity until the end of the simulation. The
prediction horizon and desired spacing among consecutive vehicles have been chosen as
Np = 20, and d = 10 meters, respectively. The parameters of the participating vehicles in
the platoon are listed in Table 6.1 which is in accordance with [184]. We have extended
the code in [185] for our security analysis.
Remark 6.9. To select an appropriate value for the prediction horizon, one has to notice
as τ increases, Np needs to be decreased in order to let the vehicles have enough time to
exchange and update their data prior to the attack occurrence. On the other hand, too
small values for Np results in frequent rapid oscillations in the control input which makes
the controller unimplementable in practice. 
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Table 6.1: Parameters of the participating vehicles in the dynamic platoon
Vehicle index mi (kg) τi (sec) CA,i (N sec
2 m−2) ri (m)
1 1035.7 0.51 0.99 0.30
cut-in 1305.9 0.63 1.00 0.40
2 1849.1 0.75 1.15 0.38
3 1934.0 0.78 1.17 0.39
4 1678.7 0.70 1.12 0.37
5 1757.7 0.73 1.13 0.38
6 1743.1 0.72 1.13 0.37
7 1392.2 0.62 1.06 0.34
6.5.1 DoS Attack Modeled as a Network Blocker
In this part, we take one more step to effectively control the dynamic heterogeneous pla-
toon endangered by an intelligent DoS intruder. As was previously described, the attacker
could jam the communication network among any two nonconsecutive vehicle to prohibits a
follower vehicle from receiving updated data. Having made an expressive scenario incorpo-
rating both cut-in and cut-out actions while taking into account a DoS attack, we consider
a same setting for the attacked platoon presented in the previous section except assuming
a vehicle merges with the platoon at t = 2sec to be placed in front of the second FV. Fur-
thermore, we let the fourth FV to perform a cut-out action at t = 4sec (see Fig. 6.6). We
note that the desired distance among the vehicles (d = 10 meters) provides enough space
for a regular vehicle to cut-in. The attack happens on the communication environment
among the first and third FVs in the time interval t ∈ [3, 6]. Although these tight actions
might not seem to happen in practice, they are chosen to challenge the algorithm largely.
Fig. 6.7 demonstrate the driving quantities of the respective platoon.
From Fig. 6.7a, one can see that despite the blockage of data transfer link from vehicle
1 to 3, there is no collision occurred in the platoon, and the safety has been ensured.
Besides, Fig. 6.7b demonstrates that Secure–DNMPC algorithm effectively mitigates the
DoS attack and the followers begin to keep tracking the leader’s speed profile shortly after
the attack is over. Convergence of torque and acceleration are also shown in Fig. 6.7c, and
6.7d. It is worth mentioning that by reducing its speed, the second FV has increased its gap
with the first FV to make the desired distance of 10m for the cut-in vehicle. Consequently,
the following vehicles have lessened their velocity to keep the desired distance. Fig. 6.7b
verifies this fact. A similar analysis exists for the cut-out maneuver where the following
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Figure 6.6: TPF dynamic heterogeneous attacked vehicle platoon with cut-in and cut-out
vehicles
vehicles have increased their velocity to reach the desired distance from the vehicles in
front.
As one can see, the spacing and speed tracking objectives have been safely fulfilled. To
have a clearer look of the spacing objective, Fig. 6.8 shows the magnified absolute positions
and the spacing error of consecutive vehicles. Since all the spacing errors in Fig. 6.8b are
greater than −10 meters, no collision has occurred. Moreover, the relative spacing error
shows jumps in the distance error (blue and purple curves) because of the cut-in/cut-out
maneuvers.3 As expected, the spacing error for the cut-out maneuver (purple curve in
Fig. 6.8b) has an opposite sign with respect to the cut-in error (blue curve in Fig. 6.8b).
Furthermore, we see that convergence has been reached in less than 14s which coincides
with Corollary 6.8 because tconv, insecure ≤ max(2, 4) + 7 + 1− 1 + 3 = 14s.
6.5.2 DoS Attack Modeled as an Exceeding Time Delay Injection
in the Data Transmission
Inherent communication delay of standard 802.11p-based DSRC network ranges from tens
to hundreds of milliseconds [191–193]. Here, to ensure modeling a highly devastating
attacker, we assume the time delay imposed by the intruder is τr = 2.5sec. In addition,
non-ideal sensors are assumed in the simulations, i.e., an additive zero-mean white Gaussian




Figure 6.7: (a) Absolute position, (b) speed, (c) torque, and (d) acceleration of the TPF
dynamic heterogeneous DoS attacked (network blocker) platoon with cut-in/cut-out ma-
neuvers equipped by Secure–DNMPC
noise with variance σ2 = 0.01 is considered on both the position and velocity sensors.4 To
challenge more the algorithm we introduce a severer attack which happens for a longer
period of time, i.e., in the time range t ∈ [3, 10]. It is worth noting that cut-in and
cut-out maneuvers are still in effect at t = 2sec and t = 4sec, respectively. Fig. 6.9
shows the performance of the proposed co-design controller on the attacked platoon with
cut-in and cut-out actions. As is demonstrated by the driving quantities, safe distance
and velocity tracking requirements have been fulfilled. Furthermore, the convergence has
been reached in less than 18s which again verifies Corollary 6.8 because tconv, insecure ≤
max(2, 4) + 7 + 1 − 1 + max(2.5, 7) = 18s. It would also be insightful to compare the
results to the case where UKF is not embedded in the design. Fig. 6.10 demonstrates the
resulting driving behavior when only relying on the controller leaving out the estimation
4This could also be considered as the environment effects on the transmitted signals. Modeling the
environment effect with white Gaussian noise in V2V communications is widely used in literature [194,195].
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.8: (a) Magnified absolute position and (b) spacing error of the TPF dynamic
heterogeneous DoS attacked (network blocker) platoon with cut-in/cut-out maneuvers
equipped by Secure–DNMPC
phase. Occurring collision and violating the control objectives clearly prove the critical
role of the observer design.
It is noticeable that by comparing the previous scenarios (Figs. 6.7, 6.9, and 6.10), it
reveals that embedding the UKF within our controller design, also has the advantage of
reducing the oscillations in the control input caused by the cyber attack. This generation
of a smoother control input enhances the driving comfort in practice.
We highlight that the proposed algorithm has also been successfully tested on differ-
ent platoon formations such as Two-Predecessor Leader Follower (TPLF), with different
spacing policies such as Constant Time Headway (CTH) policy, and also on Federal Test
Procedure (FTP) drive cycle to emulate urban driving.
6.6 Summary
This chapter dealt with a broadly concerned control problem, namely the dynamic het-
erogeneous platoon control. As was explained before, a platoon is mainly consisted of
networking and data transmission among the vehicles, forming the cyber layer, and the
physical environment composed of the participant cars, forming the physical layer. This
cyber-physical system is highly prone to cyber attacks endangering the wireless connectivity
among the vehicles. This vulnerability to external attackers needs to be fully addressed as
an insecure communication layer in a platoon can cause manipulated and/or missing data




Figure 6.9: (a) Absolute position, (b) speed, (c) torque, and (d) acceleration of the TPF
dynamic heterogeneous DoS attacked (exceeding time delay injector) platoon with cut-
in/cut-out maneuvers equipped by Secure–DNMPC–UKF co-design
widespread so-called DoS attack in which the intelligent intruder targets the wireless links
by overwhelming the node by invalid requests, hence, either blocks the network or prevents
it from timely data transfer. We proposed a Secure–Distributed Nonlinear Model Predic-
tive Control (Secure–DNMPC) framework to ensure a safe and secure dynamic platooning
which fulfills both the safe distancing between the cars and speed tracking requirements.
The method is capable of handling cut-in/cut-out maneuvers under the premise of the
existence of a cyber DoS attack. The algorithm is basically comprised of detection and
mitigation phases.
Furthermore, we introduced a novel Secure–DNMPC–UKF co-design for the case when
the DoS attacker injects a huge amount of time delay in the network compared to the
intrinsic practical DSRC time delay. This makes use of the available but outdated data
to estimate and predict future states. The proposed approach also provides the oppor-




Figure 6.10: (a) Absolute position, (b) speed, (c) torque, and (d) acceleration of the TPF
dynamic heterogeneous DoS attacked (exceeding time delay injector) platoon with cut-
in/cut-out maneuvers without UKF design
compromised signals sent through a realistic noisy environment can be considered as well.
Simulation results demonstrated the efficacy of the introduced technique. As a future di-
rection, one can think of generalizing the given algorithm to a multi-platooning scenario in
which two or more attacked platoons drive in parallel, and arbitrary vehicles wish to exit
their own platoon and merge with an adjacent one. Also, other types of attacks and the
corresponding countermeasures could be considered.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Works
This thesis is devoted to design, analysis, and verification of control techniques for safe
and secure vehicle platooning.
In Chapter 3, we have focused on security and robustness analysis of vehicle platoons
based on a graph-theoretic approach and proposed a novel optimal sensor placement strat-
egy. The vehicles have been assumed to be able to communicate data, such as inter-
vehicular distance and speed among each other via wireless communication environments.
Both the unidirectional and bidirectional data transfer have been studied. Moreover, the
quality of communication links between the vehicles has been considered using edge weights
of the underlying path graph topology. The platoon is assumed to be under cyber attacks,
and a detector is supposed to choose a strategy to place his monitoring sensors on specific
vehicles aiming at increasing the detectability of the attacker. An attacker-detector game
has been defined based on which the existence of any possible NE points have been stud-
ied. Based on our results, the detector can decide about his sensor placement strategy to
increase the security level of the system. Also, robustness analysis of a platoon against
adding extra communication links between the vehicles has performed. Furthermore, our
study verifies the fact that using a bidirectional communication environment forms a more
secure platoon compared to the unidirectional counterpart. Our simulation and experi-
mental results verified the effectiveness of our theoretical analyses. An open avenue for the
current research is to extend the underlying graph topology such that it can handle dy-
namic platoon formations resulted from different vehicle maneuvers such as cut-in/cut-out
actions, hence, studying the impacts of those movements on the security of vehicle pla-
tooning. Besides, the extension of this work to the dynamic game (with changing network
topology) along with generalizing our method for possibly different vehicle dynamics in the
platoon referred to as the “heterogeneous” case are left as our future studies.
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In Chapter 4, a game-theoretic approach has been proposed to tackle the security
challenges of vehicle platoons via a new optimal actuator placement strategy. From the
viewpoint of secure platoon control, we studied the problem of threatening a vehicle platoon
by one (or more) attacker(s) who tries to deteriorate the platoon control by injection of
acceleration attack signal(s) to the longitudinal dynamics of one (or more) of the vehicles.
In essence, we focused on the energy needed by the attacker, as our game-payoff, to steer
the consensus dynamics of the system towards his desired direction in the state space.
In this regard, the attacker(s) basically tries to minimize the amount of energy needed
to deviate the system dynamics, while the defender(s) faces this action by attempting to
maximize that energy. This confrontation between the attacker(s) and defender(s) was
formulated as a Stackelberg game problem, and the algorithm to solve the game was given.
Based on the equilibrium point of the game, the defender(s) selects specific nodes(s) to
place his actuator(s) in order to mitigate the attack effects as far as possible. Two different
scenarios, namely single attacker–single defender and multi attackers–multi defenders were
considered. The game formulation, its solution, and simulation results were presented
for h–nearest neighbor platoons with different data transfer structures. The proposed
technique can be applied to arbitrary data transfer structures employed in different platoon
formation topologies. Besides, the effects of increasing the connectivity among the vehicles
on the security level of the platoon have been studied. Some experimental tests were also
conducted on a real platoon to demonstrate the applicability of the method in practice. An
open avenue for this research would be to generalize the work to study a platoon consisting
of vehicles with different dynamics referred to as “heterogeneous” platoons. Besides, one
can think of a combination of cyber attacks imposed on the platoon; hence, a multi-
component game pay-off can be considered reflecting the game values corresponding to
different attacks.
Chapter 5 was devoted to a study where we focused on a general static heterogeneous
platoon formation under the risk of the widespread so-called DoS attack. A DoS intelligent
intruder targets the wireless links by overwhelming the node by invalid requests, hence,
either blocks the network or prevents it from timely data transfer. As was explained before,
a platoon is mainly consisted of networking and data transmission among the vehicles,
forming the cyber layer, and the physical environment composed of the participant cars,
forming the physical layer. This cyber-physical system is highly prone to cyber attacks
endangering the wireless connectivity among the vehicles. This vulnerability to external
attackers needs to be fully addressed as an insecure communication layer in a platoon can
cause manipulated and/or missing data received by the followers resulting in dangerous
hazards. We proposed a secure control algorithm which enables the platoon to detect and
mitigate the devastation imposed by the intruder. The algorithm guarantees the desired
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platoon performance in terms of its control objectives together with its safety. Besides, the
proposed method tackles the attacker regardless of the employed communication topology
among the vehicles. Simulations performed on a TPF heterogeneous platoon with practical
vehicle dynamics parameters, indicate the efficacy of the proposed technique. Dealing with
other cyber attacks along with achieving additional performance objectives such as driving
comfort and ecological driving are left as our future studies. In addition, deriving an
upper bound on the attack duration ensuring a safe and secure platooning deserves further
research. Furthermore, from a practical point of view, the real-time implementability
test via Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) can be conducted to assess the turnaround time of
the algorithm and potentially optimize it for a faster run. Then, the algorithm can be
implemented and tested on a full-scale vehicle platoon.
In Chapter 6, we dealt with a broadly concerned control problem, namely the dynamic
heterogeneous platoon control under the risk of a DoS attack. We proposed a Secure–
Distributed Nonlinear Model Predictive Control (Secure–DNMPC) framework to ensure
a safe and secure dynamic platooning which fulfills both the safe distancing between the
cars and speed tracking requirements. The method is capable of handling cut-in/cut-out
maneuvers under the premise of the existence of a cyber DoS attack. The algorithm is
basically comprised of detection and mitigation phases. Furthermore, we introduced a
novel Secure–DNMPC–UKF co-design for the case when the DoS attacker injects a huge
amount of time delay in the network compared to the intrinsic practical DSRC time delay.
This makes use of the available but outdated data to estimate and predict future states.
The proposed approach also provides the opportunity to consider non-ideal sensors which
contaminate the measured data. In addition, compromised signals sent through a realistic
noisy environment can be considered as well. Simulation results demonstrated the efficacy
of the introduced technique. As a future direction, one can think of generalizing the given
algorithm to a multi-platooning scenario in which two or more attacked platoons drive in
parallel, and arbitrary vehicles wish to exit their own platoon and merge with an adjacent
one. Besides, to capture more realistic vehicle dynamics, the tire model can be embedded
in the system modeling. Furthermore, generalization of the proposed method to make the
controller robust against model parameter uncertainties can be further investigated. Also,
other types of attacks and the corresponding countermeasures could be considered.
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[5] Çetin Kaya Koç. Cyber-Physical Systems Security. Springer, 2018.
[6] Hao Liu, Ben Niu, and Yuzhe Li. False-data-injection attacks on remote distributed
consensus estimation. IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, 2020.
[7] Abdulmalik Humayed, Jingqiang Lin, Fengjun Li, and Bo Luo. Cyber-physical sys-
tems securitya survey. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 4(6):1802–1831, 2017.
[8] Yosef Ashibani and Qusay H Mahmoud. Cyber physical systems security: Analysis,
challenges and solutions. Computers & Security, 68:81–97, 2017.
[9] Saqib Ali, Taiseera Al Balushi, Zia Nadir, and Omar Khadeer Hussain. Cyber Security
for Cyber Physical Systems, volume 768. Springer, 2018.
[10] Mohammad Hossein Basiri, Nasser L. Azad, and Sebastian Fischmeister. Distributed
time-varying kalman filter design and estimation over wireless sensor networks us-
ing owa sensor fusion technique. In 28th Mediterranean Conference on Control and
Automation (MED), Saint-Raphael, France. IEEE, 2020.
112
[11] Ralph Langner. Stuxnet: Dissecting a cyberwarfare weapon. IEEE Security &
Privacy, 9(3):49–51, 2011.
[12] James P Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski. Stuxnet and the future of cyber war. Survival,
53(1):23–40, 2011.
[13] Yao Liu, Peng Ning, and Michael K Reiter. False data injection attacks against state
estimation in electric power grids. ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security (TISSEC), 14(1):13, 2011.
[14] Yasser Shoukry, Paul Martin, Paulo Tabuada, and Mani Srivastava. Non-invasive
spoofing attacks for anti-lock braking systems. In International Workshop on Cryp-
tographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 55–72. Springer, 2013.
[15] Dongyao Jia, Kejie Lu, Jianping Wang, Xiang Zhang, and Xuemin Shen. A survey
on platoon-based vehicular cyber-physical systems. IEEE communications surveys
& tutorials, 18(1):263–284, 2016.
[16] Santokh Singh. Critical reasons for crashes investigated in the national motor vehicle
crash causation survey. Technical report, 2015.
[17] Transport Canada. Canadian motor vehicle traffic collision statistics. 2014.
[18] Road Safety in Canada, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/
motorvehiclesafety/tp-tp15145-1201.htm, October, 2018.
[19] Paul Godsmark, B Kirk, V Gill, and B Flemming. Automated vehicles: The coming
of the next disruptive technology. 2015.




[21] Bart Van Arem, Cornelie JG Van Driel, and Ruben Visser. The impact of cooper-
ative adaptive cruise control on traffic-flow characteristics. IEEE Transactions on
Intelligent Transportation Systems, 7(4):429–436, 2006.
[22] Feng Gao, Shengbo Eben Li, Yang Zheng, and Dongsuk Kum. Robust control of
heterogeneous vehicular platoon with uncertain dynamics and communication delay.
IET Intelligent Transport Systems, 10(7):503–513, 2016.
113
[23] Siyuan Gong, Anye Zhou, Jian Wang, Tao Li, and Srinivas Peeta. Cooperative adap-
tive cruise control for a platoon of connected and autonomous vehicles considering
dynamic information flow topology. arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.02224, 2018.
[24] Lei Lin, Siyuan Gong, and Tao Li. Deep learning-based human-driven vehicle trajec-
tory prediction and its application for platoon control of connected and autonomous
vehicles. In The Autonomous Vehicles Symposium, 2018.
[25] Xiaotian Sun, Roberto Horowitz, and Chin-Woo Tan. An efficient lane change maneu-
ver for platoons of vehicles in an automated highway system. In ASME 2003 Inter-
national Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition, pages 355–362. American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2003.
[26] Stanley Lam and Jayantha Katupitiya. Cooperative autonomous platoon maneu-
vers on highways. In Advanced Intelligent Mechatronics (AIM), 2013 IEEE/ASME
International Conference on, pages 1152–1157. IEEE, 2013.
[27] Vicente Milanés and Steven E Shladover. Handling cut-in vehicles in strings of
cooperative adaptive cruise control vehicles. Journal of Intelligent Transportation
Systems, 20(2):178–191, 2016.
[28] Vicente Milanés, Steven E Shladover, John Spring, Christopher Nowakowski, Hiroshi
Kawazoe, and Masahide Nakamura. Cooperative adaptive cruise control in real traffic
situations. IEEE Trans. Intelligent Transportation Systems, 15(1):296–305, 2014.
[29] Ziran Wang, BaekGyu Kim, Hiromitsu Kobayashi, Guoyuan Wu, and Matthew J
Barth. Agent-based modeling and simulation of connected and automated vehi-
cles using game engine: A cooperative on-ramp merging study. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1810.09952, 2018.
[30] Elham Semsar Kazerooni and Jeroen Ploeg. Interaction protocols for cooperative
merging and lane reduction scenarios. In Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC),
2015 IEEE 18th International Conference on, pages 1964–1970. IEEE, 2015.
[31] Hoai Hoang Bengtsson, Lei Chen, Alexey Voronov, and Cristofer Englund. Inter-
action protocol for highway platoon merge. In Intelligent Transportation Systems
(ITSC), 2015 IEEE 18th International Conference on, pages 1971–1976. IEEE, 2015.
[32] Takeshi Sakaguchi, Atsuya Uno, and Sadayuki Tsugawa. Inter-vehicle communica-
tions for merging control. In Vehicle Electronics Conference, 1999.(IVEC’99) Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE International, pages 365–370. IEEE, 1999.
114
[33] Michael P Vitus and Claire J Tomlin. A hybrid method for chance constrained
control in uncertain environments. In Decision and Control (CDC), 2012 IEEE 51st
Annual Conference on, pages 2177–2182. IEEE, 2012.
[34] Michael P Vitus and Claire J Tomlin. A probabilistic approach to planning and
control in autonomous urban driving. In Decision and Control (CDC), 2013 IEEE
52nd Annual Conference on, pages 2459–2464. IEEE, 2013.
[35] Xiangjun Qian, Jean Gregoire, Arnaud De La Fortelle, and Fabien Moutarde. Decen-
tralized model predictive control for smooth coordination of automated vehicles at
intersection. In Control Conference (ECC), 2015 European, pages 3452–3458. IEEE,
2015.
[36] Laleh Makarem and Denis Gillet. Model predictive coordination of autonomous
vehicles crossing intersections. In Intelligent Transportation Systems-(ITSC), 2013
16th International IEEE Conference on, pages 1799–1804. IEEE, 2013.
[37] David Lenz, Tobias Kessler, and Alois Knoll. Stochastic model predictive controller
with chance constraints for comfortable and safe driving behavior of autonomous
vehicles. In Intelligent Vehicles Symposium, pages 292–297, 2015.
[38] Dominik Moser, Luigi del Re, and Stephen Jones. A risk constrained control approach
for adaptive cruise control. In Control Technology and Applications (CCTA), 2017
IEEE Conference on, pages 578–583. IEEE, 2017.
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control of cyber-physical systems against denial-of-service attacks. In 2013 6th In-
ternational Symposium on Resilient Control Systems (ISRCS), pages 54–59. IEEE,
2013.
[180] Heng Zhang, Peng Cheng, Ling Shi, and Jiming Chen. Optimal denial-of-service
attack scheduling with energy constraint. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
60(11):3023–3028, 2015.
[181] Qi Sun, Kunwu Zhang, and Yang Shi. Resilient model predictive control of cyber-
physical systems under dos attacks. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics,
2019.
[182] Roger A Horn and Charles R Johnson. Matrix analysis. Cambridge university press,
2012.
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Proofs of Chapter 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Before proving Lemma 3.5 we need the following preliminary definition.
Definition A.1 ([115]). A spanning subgraph of a graph G is called a 2-tree of G, if and
only if, it has two components each of which is a tree. In other words, a 2-tree of G consists
of two trees with disjoint vertices which together span G. One (or both) of the components
may consist of an isolated node. We refer to tab,cd as a 2-tree where vertices a and b are in
one component of the 2-tree, and vertices c and d in the other. 
Based on the above definition, we prove Lemma 3.5.
Proof: The proof is based on the fact that [L−1g ]ij =
cof(Lg)ij,`,`
det(Lg)
. Thus, it is sufficient to
provide graph-theoretic definitions of the nominator and denominator of this fraction. For






Moreover, for the nominator, the cofactor is equal to the sum of the impedance product
of all 2-trees tij,`. Let us denote the set of edges in the path between nodes i and j by Rij.
This path is unique since the graph is a tree. Defining Rij = {Ri` ∪ Rj`} \ {Ri` ∩ Rj`}
and πR =
∏
i∈Rij , we can write
cof(Lg)ij,`,` = πRw2w3...w|Ri`∩Ri`| + πRw1w3...w|Ri`∩Ri`|
πRw1w2w4...w|Ri`∩Ri`| + ...+ πRw2...w|Ri`∩Ri`|−1. (A.2)
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By dividing (A.2) by det(Lg) from (A.1) the result will be obtained. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof: Due to the triangular structure of Lg and L
−1
g , we can obtain the elements of
L−1g by solving each row of L
−1




A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.14
Proof: Without loss of generality, we denote the ordering of the nodes in the path
starting from the leader to the end of the path by v`, v1, v2, . . . , vj, . . . , vi, . . . , vn. For
the case that an extra edge is added between nodes j and i, using Sherman-Morrison






















[L−1g ]1i − [L−1g ]1j
[L−1g ]2i − [L−1g ]2j
...
[L−1g ]ni − [L−1g ]nj


[L−1g ]i1 − [L−1g ]j1
[L−1g ]i2 − [L−1g ]j2
...




where eij = ei−ej. The diagonal elements of (A.4) have the form
(
[L−1g ]ki − [L−1g ]kj
)2
, 1 ≤
k ≤ n as the L−1g is a symmetric matrix. We need to show that the off-diagonal elements
of (A.4) are non-negative. Without loss of generality let us suppose the form of the off-
diagonal elements as
(
[L−1g ]ki − [L−1g ]kj
) (
[L−1g ]il − [L−1g ]jl
)
for any 1 ≤ k, l ≤ n. If 1 ≤
k ≤ j or 1 ≤ l ≤ j, then
(
[L−1g ]ki − [L−1g ]kj
) (
[L−1g ]il − [L−1g ]jl
)
= 0 (based on Lemma 3.5).
Let us suppose j ≤ k ≤ i. In this case one can easily verify that for any value of l,
i.e., either j ≤ l ≤ i, or i ≤ l ≤ n, [L−1g ]ki − [L−1g ]kj and [L−1g ]il − [L−1g ]jl have the
same sign. Now let us suppose i ≤ k ≤ n. With the same argument we conclude that(
[L−1g ]ki − [L−1g ]kj
) (
[L−1g ]il − [L−1g ]jl
)





g eij ≥ 0. We have eTijL−1g eij = [L−1g ]ii−2[L−1g ]ij +[L−1g ]jj which is the effective
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resistance of the added edge between nodes j and i and hence is positive [197]. Thus, the
second term in (A.3) is a non-negative matrix. This implies that the elements of L̃−1g are
not larger than those of L−1g . This along with Lemma 3.4 complete the proof. 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.15
Proof: Without loss of generality, we denote the ordering of the nodes in the path
starting from the leader to the end of the path the same as proof of Theorem 3.14. For
the case that an extra edge is added from node j to node i (not making a cycle), using
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Hence, the second term in (A.5) is a non-negative matrix. This implies that the elements
of L̃−1g are not larger than those of L
−1
g . This result along with Lemma 3.4 prove the claim.
For the case that an extra edge is added from node i to node j (making a cycle), with
the same argument it can be easily shown that the second term in (A.5) is a non-positive
matrix. This completes the proof. 
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